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1. Introduction 
A bubble on asset is defined as a deviation of an asset’s market value from its fundamental 
value. Economic history has repeatedly witnessed severe financial crises accompanied by the 
bursting of bubbles. Aliber and Kindleberger (2015) report that prices of various assets, 
including stocks, land, and real estate, often deviate upward from their fundamental values, and 
possibly affect various economic activities, such as consumption, investment, economic 
growth and unemployment. They state that during bubble periods, in some cases the bubble 
would arise on a single type of asset, while in other cases it would arise on various types of 
assets, with different effects on the economy. Additionally, bubbles are frequently observed 
when the economy is booming and the economic growth rate is high (Martin and Ventura, 
2012; Famer and Schelnast, 2013, ch. 6). Indeed, empirical studies have shown that there is a 
negative relationship between stock market wealth and the unemployment rate. A correlation 
between stock market and unemployment is found to hold for European countries (Fitoussi et 
al., 2000). Moreover, the US stock market boom of the 1990s was accompanied by a reduction 
in the unemployment rate (Phelps, 1999).  
 As a result, the purpose of this paper is as follows. First, we construct an equilibrium model, 
in which two types of asset bubbles exist simultaneously and analyze their effects on the 
economy. Second, we develop an overlapping-generations model with labor market frictions 
to examine the relationship among bubbles, unemployment and economic growth.  
 In his seminal study, Tirole (1985) using an overlapping-generations model, shows that 
pure bubbles on intrinsically useless assets, such as fiat money, can exist in the equilibrium.1 
If the equilibrium without bubbles is dynamically inefficient, that is, too much capital is being 
accumulated in the equilibrium, bubbles can arise in the equilibrium and affect real economic 
activity, such as consumption, capital accumulation, and production. When bubbles arise, they 
crowd out savings from capital accumulation, thus leading to a change in the intergenerational 
resource allocation. This property is called the crowd-out effect of bubbles. Saint-Paul (1992), 
Grossman and Yanagawa (1993), King and Ferguson (1993), and Futagami and Shibata (2000) 
extend Tirole’s (1985) model to an endogenous growth framework. Their studies re-examine 
                                                   
1 Kamihigashi (2001, 2003, 2005), using a transversality condition, shows that asset bubbles 
are impossible in infinitely-lived agent models with continuous and discrete time. Kamihigashi 
(2015) assumes a sequential budget constraint and establishes a simple non-bubble theorem 
that can be used to reject asset bubbles in a wide range of infinitely-lived agent models.  
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the necessary condition for the existence of bubbles and show that even if the equilibrium 
without bubbles is not dynamically inefficient, bubbles can exist in the equilibrium. In the 
endogenous growth framework, when bubbles arise in the economy, they divert savings from 
capital accumulation, which leads to lower economic growth. Kunieda and Shibata (2016) call 
the above mentioned literature first-generation models, because only crowd-out effects on 
capital accumulation arise in these models. 
 On the other hand, using the research and development (R&D)-based endogenous growth 
model developed by Romer (1990), Olivier (2000) considers a bubble on a stock asset rather 
than an intrinsically useless asset, and shows that bubbles can enhance economic growth. When 
bubbles arise on stocks in new firms created by R&D activities, which lead to the higher return 
of R&D activities, households allocate more labor inputs to the R&D sector, and realize a 
higher growth rate. This property of stimulating R&D activities is called the growth enhancing 
effect. However, Olivier’s model does not consider the crowd-out effect of bubbles stated by 
Grossman and Yanagawa (1993). Tanaka (2011) uses an endogenous growth model different 
from Romer’s (1990), to re-examine the robustness of Olivier’s (2000) results. He constructs a 
model where bubbles on new firm’s stocks created by R&D activities have not only a growth 
enhancing effect, but also a crowd-out effect; moreover, this shows that a bubble on stock 
assets can enhance economic growth through a different mechanism compared to Olivier’s 
model. However, all of the above studies consider only one type of bubbly asset, that is, a 
bubble on an intrinsically useless asset having a crowd-out effect or a bubble on a stock having 
growth enhancing effect.2  
 In chapter 2, we construct a model economy in which two types of asset bubbles can exist 
at the same time and investigate conditions for them to arise. One of them is a bubble on an 
intrinsically useless asset, that is, nonproductive savings, and the other is a bubble on the stocks 
of firms newly created by R&D activities. We call the first type pure bubble and the second 
type stock bubble, and derive a condition for the two types of asset bubbles to simultaneously 
arise in a steady state equilibrium. If the supply of pure bubbles grows at a constant rate, a 
steady state equilibrium with two types of asset bubbles can exist in the economy. Additionally, 
we show that pure and stock bubbles enhance economic growth in the steady state equilibrium. 
                                                   
2 Clain-Chamosset-Yvrard and Kamihigashi (2016) considers two types of asset bubbles in 
the two-country model. However, they only consider the crow-out effect and do not analyze 
the relationship between bubbles and economic growth.  
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 The drawback of the first-generations models is that their theoretical results are 
inconsistent with real world data that bubbles seem to enhance economic growth. To overcome 
this, the literature on asset bubbles and economic growth has been recently focusing on the 
presence of asset bubbles promoting capital accumulation and economic growth. In this 
literature, financial market imperfections and productivity differences across agents are key 
factors in producing a situation such that asset bubbles enhance capital accumulation. Farhi 
and Tirole (2012), Martin and Ventura (2012), Carvalho et al. (2012), and Kunieda (2014) 
create such situations using the overlapping generations framework of Samuelson (1958), 
Tirole (1985), or Blanchard (1985). To produce the same situation, Aoki and Nikolov (2015) 
and, Hirano and Yanagawa (2016) use dynamic general equilibrium models, in which asset 
bubbles arise in equilibrium despite the assumption that infinitely-lived agents, and the 
presence of bubbles promotes economic growth through a mechanism similar to that founded 
by Mitsui and Watanabe (1989). These models all use an asset bubble on intrinsically useless 
assets. Using utility depends on wealth, Kamihigashi (2008) shows how stock market bubbles 
cause output fluctuations and affect output positively if the production function exhibits 
increasing returns to scale. However, these second- and first-generations models do not analyze 
how unemployment is affected by the presence of asset bubbles. As such, in chapters 3, 4, and 
5, we introduce a search and matching model, where unemployment arises in the equilibrium 
into an overlapping-generations model, and investigate the relationship among bubbles, 
unemployment and capital accumulation. In chapters 3 and 4, we use a first-generation model 
according to literature on bubble, and in chapter 5, we use a second-generation model. 
 In chapter 3, we construct a continuous-time overlapping-generations model with labour 
market frictions to examine the relationships among unemployment, asset bubbles, and 
economic growth. We show that the existence of asset bubbles is contingent upon the 
unemployment rate: a bubble (non-bubble) regime arises in equilibrium when unemployment 
is relatively low (high). Our framework focuses on the boom and bust of asset bubbles caused 
by changes in fundamental variables, not a stochastic probability. Then, as labor market 
frictions generate a negative relationship between the unemployment rate, the interest rate and 
economic growth, we find that the bubble regime exhibits a higher growth rate than the non-
bubble one. Furthermore, we show that policy or parameter changes that have a positive 
influence on the labor market shift the economy from a non-bubble to a bubble regime.  
 In chapter 4, using an overlapping-generations model of R&D-based growth with labor 
market frictions, we examines how employment changes induced by labor market frictions 
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influence asset bubbles and economic growth. We show that the existence of bubbles is 
contingent upon the equilibrium employment rate. Asset bubbles can (not) exist when 
employment rate is high (low), which leads to higher (lower) economic growth through labor 
market efficiency. This result is similar to one chapter 3. We explore the steady state and 
transitional dynamics of bubbles, economic growth, and employment. Furthermore, we show 
that policy or parameter changes that have a negative influence on the labor market leads to a 
bubble burst.  
 In chapter 5, a tractable overlapping-generations model with asset bubbles is presented to 
demonstrate that a financial crisis caused by bubbles bursting increase unemployment rates. 
Without asset bubbles, all agents engage in capital production regardless of their idiosyncratic 
productivity shocks. A bubbly asset has a positive market value, because selling the asset is a 
fund-raising method for agents who draw sufficiently high productivity to initiate an 
investment project, whereas purchasing the bubbly asset is the sole saving method for agents 
who draw very low productivity. The presence of asset bubbles corrects allocative inefficiency, 
reallocating investment resources from low productive agents to highly productive one. 
Additionally, under mild parameter conditions, the presence of asset bubbles promotes capital 
accumulation and reduces the unemployment rate. However, a self-fulfilling financial crisis 
caused by extrinsic uncertainty would result in high unemployment rates. 
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2. An equilibrium model with two types of asset bubbles 
2.1. Introduction 
Aliber and Kindleberger (2015) highlight that bubbles have occurred throughout history, often 
with major impacts on local economies. Some examples include the current recession in the 
United States and other countries, the Japanese experience in the late 1980s and 1990s, and 
1929 crash. They state that during bubble periods, in some cases the bubble would arise on a 
single type of asset, while in other cases it would arise on various types of assets, with different 
effects on the economy. Additionally, assets markets worldwide are very volatile and the prices 
of various assets such as stocks, land, and real estate rise rapidly (Miao 2015). The purpose of 
this chapter is to construct model economy in which various asset bubbles can exist at same 
time, and investigate relationship between them analytically. More specifically, we focus on 
two types of asset bubbles that are bubbles on the intrinsically useless asset and on stock of 
firm and analyze the effect of two types of bubbles on the economy. 
 In his seminal study, Tirole (1985) examines the condition for the existence of bubbles on 
intrinsically useless assets in an overlapping generations model. Bubbles on intrinsically 
useless asset can be positive in the overlapping generations model if the steady state 
equilibrium without bubbles is dynamically inefficient; that is, equilibria with too capital 
accumulation. Grossman and Yanagawa (1993), King and Ferguson (1993), and Futagami and 
Shibata (2000) extend Tirole’s model to an endogenous growth framework. They re-examine 
the conditions necessary for bubbles to exist and show the relationships between bubbles and 
economic growth. In their models, there is too little rather than too much capital. In addition, a 
bubble arising in the economy diverts savings from capital accumulation and retards economic 
growth. This property is called the crowding out effect.  
 For an alternative perspective on bubbles, using an R&D-based model of endogenous 
growth, Olivier (2000) considers bubbles not as useless assets, but as assets tied to capital goods. 
As such, he shows that when bubbles arise in R&D firms, bubbles can increase economic 
growth. This is growth enhancing effect. Bubbles on stocks of firms positively affect the grow 
rate by encouraging the creation of new firms. However, Olivier (2000) does not consider the 
crowding out effect of bubbles, as Grossman and Yanagawa (1993) emphasize. Tanaka(2011), 
using an alternative endogenous growth model, re-examines Olivier’s (2000) properties of 
stock bubbles and shows that stock bubbles have both a growth enhancing effect and a 
crowding out effect. He derives the different results from Olivier(2000). However, all of the 
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above studies consider only a single type of a bubbly asset, that is, bubbles on intrinsically 
useless asset or on stocks.   
 Based on Tanaka (2011), we construct a model economy in which bubbles on an 
intrinsically useless asset and on stocks can exist simultaneously and analyze the relationship 
between them. We call the first type a pure bubble and the second type a stock bubble. Pure 
and stock bubbles have deferent properties in an economy. The former crowds out productive 
savings away from capital accumulation through the crowding out effect, which lowers 
economic growth. the later type has both a crowding out effect and a growth enhancing effect 
which, enhances growth by stimulating R&D activities.  
 We derive a condition for pure and stock bubbles to exist in the equilibrium. When the 
supply of pure bubbles is constant, the condition for pure bubbles to exist in a steady state 
equilibrium is when the economic growth rate equals the market interest rate. On the other 
hand, stock bubbles can exist only if the growth rate is greater than the market interest rate. 
Thus, pure and stock bubbles can-not coexist in the equilibrium. However, if the supply of pure 
bubbles grows at a constant rate, the steady state equilibrium with pure and stock bubbles can 
exist in the economy because the condition for the existence of pure bubbles becomes when 
economic growth rate is greater than the market interest rate. 
 We show that pure and stock bubbles increase the economic growth rate. The change in 
the initial arising in the stock price of a new firm through R&D activity has three effects on the 
growth rate. First, an increase in the initial bubble increases the quantity of stock bubbles, 
which strengthens crowding out effect of stock bubbles. Second, the initial bubble decreases 
pure bubbles and weakens their crowding out effect. Third, an increase in the initial bubble 
increase the return in the R&D sector, and hence has a positive effect on a growth rate. The 
positive effect dominates the negative crowding out effect in a steady state equilibrium with 
pure and stock bubbles. The rate of supply of a pure bubble positively affects the growth rate 
of an economy with two types of bubbles due to an increase in asset holdings. When 
governments distribute a new pure bubble asset to households as a transfer payment as a lump-
sum, households believe they are wealthier and want to save more. This leads to the higher the 
growth rate in an economy with two types of bubbles.  
 The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 outlines the features of the 
model. Section 3 derives the condition for bubbles to exist in a steady state equilibrium and 
investigate the effects parameter changes on the growth rate. The final section summarizes our 
findings and concludes the chapter. 
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2.2 The Model 
This section develops a two-period overlapping generations model with two types of asset 
bubbles. The economy begins in period 0, and the cohort born in period t is generation t. Each 
generation has a constant labor size (L) , which is supplied inelastically. The economy has two 
types of asset bubbles, defined as the difference between the fundamental and market values 
of an asset. First, following Tirole (1985), we consider a bubble on an intrinsically useless 
asset; that is the fundamental value is zero, which we call a pure bubble. The second type is a 
bubble on a stocks of new firms created via R&D activities, which we call a stock bubble. On 
the production side, the economy consists of three sectors: a final goods sector, an intermediate 
goods sector, and an R&D sector. The labor market is open only in the final goods sector. In 
accordance with Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004, Chap. 6), 
we regard final goods as the production factor in both the intermediate goods and R&D sectors. 
R&D firms invent blueprints of intermediate goods and launch these goods into the market. 
Each intermediate good is produced by a single monopoly firm. Each final good is produced 
by competitive firms using labor and a variety of imperfectly substitutable intermediate goods 
as input. 
2.2.1. The final goods sector 
In the final goods sector, the many homogenous firms produce final goods with the same 
production technology. We normalize the number of firms to one without loss of generality. A 
firm needs workers and intermediate goods to produce final goods. The production function of 
the firm is given by 
  djjxALY t
N
ttt
aa ))((
0
1 ò-= , (1) 
where A, Nt, Lt and )( jxt are the productivity of the technology, the number of varieties 
available at period t, the labor input, and the input of intermediate goods for product variety j, 
respectively. The final good is set as the model numeraire, so the firm’s profit is 
 òò --= -
tt N
ttt
x
t
N
tt
y
t LwdjjxjpdjjxAL 00
1 )()())(( aap , (2) 
where ptx(j) and xt(j) are the price and the input of intermediate goods for product variety j, 
respectively. Because the factor market is competitive, we can get first order conditions from 
maximization problem, as follows: 
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Using (4), the demand function for an intermediate good for variety j is given by 
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2.2.2 The intermediate goods sector 
There are Nt types of intermediate goods at the beginning of period t and each intermediate 
good j is produced by monopolistically competitive firms that hold a blueprint for intermediate 
good j. We assume that one unit of final goods is required to produce one unit of an intermediate 
good, and the operating profit of each intermediate goods producer )( jtp  is 
( ) )(1)()( jxjpj txtt -=p , where 𝑥"(𝑗)  is the supply of intermediate good j. Under 
monopolistic competition, each firm maximizes its profits given the demand function (5) by 
establishing a price that is equal to a constant markup over unit cost: 
 
a
1)( == xxt pjp . (6) 
Thus, we can drop the firm-specific index in the intermediate goods sector and express profits 
as follows:  
 LA aa
a
aap --
+
-= 1
1
1
1
)1( , (7) 
in which we use the labor market equilibrium condition 𝐿" = 𝐿. We define the fundamental 
value of firm j’s stock price at period t as 
 !+
++
+
+
=
+++ )1)(1(1 211 ttt
t rrr
D
pp
, (8) 
where tr  represents the market interest rate at period t. 
2.2.3. The R&D sector 
R&D technology development requires final goods as inputs. We assume that the cost of 
inventing new blueprints is h units of the final goods between periods t and t + 1. Competitive 
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R&D firms can invent one unit of tt NN -+1  new blueprints; thus, we express the output of 
R&D firms as follows: 
 )( 1 tt
R
t NNI -= +h . (9) 
where RtI  denotes final goods devoted to the R&D sector. R&D firms can sell these blueprints 
to intermediate goods firms at their market values of Dt. Hence, the benefit from R&D activity 
in period t is Dt. In this study, however, we consider an economy in which the market value of 
stock is greater than the fundamental value of the firm. More specifically, following 
Tanaka(2011), bubbles arise on the stocks of new firms holding a new blueprint. The market 
value of the stock at the beginning of period t is ),( ttBDt + ; thus, the value of R&D activity is 
),( ttBDt +  in period t. Here we define ),( tsB  as a bubble occuring in period t on the firm 
created by R&D activity in period s (this new firm can produce intermediate goods in period 
s+1). ),( ttB  is a bubble that arise in period t on the firm just created by R&D activity in the 
same period t (this firm can produce intermediate goods in period t+1), and we assume that 
BttB =),(  is constant over time. We call this B the initial bubble. Assuming free entry in the 
R&D sector, the following condition holds in an equilibrium with a finite size of R&D activity: 
 h=+ BDt . (10) 
 We next consider no-arbitrage conditions. We represent the market value of a firm’s stock 
created by R&D activity at period s at the beginning of period t as 
 ]),1[(),(),( tstsBDtsV t -Î+= 　　　　 . (11) 
The market value of intermediate goods firms V(s,t) is related to the risk-free interest rate rt+1. 
Shareholders of intermediate goods firms who purchased these shares during period t at price 
V(s,t) obtain dividends of 1+tp  during period t + 1 and can sell these shares to the subsequent 
generation at a value of )1,( +tsV . In the financial market, the rate of return on holding this 
stock must be equal to the risk-free interest rate 1+ rt+1, which implies the following no-
arbitrage condition: for all t, the return on one unit of the stock must be equal to the interest 
rate: 
 11 1),(
)1,(
+
+ +=
++
t
t r
tsV
tsVp . (12) 
By substituting (10) and (11) into (12), we can obtain the interest rate  
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B
r
-
=
h
p . (13) 
Thus, the interest rate is constant over time. Using (8), (11) and (12), the initial bubble grows 
at the interest rate.  
 ]),1[(),()1()1,( tstsBrtsB -Î+=+ 　　　 . (14) 
Above equation (14) implies that the bubble on a stock must grow at the market interest rate 
to satisfy the no-arbitrage condition.   
2.2.4. Households 
We refer to the first and second periods of household’ lifetimes as young and old, respectively. 
The cohort born in period t is called generation t. We normalize the number households to one, 
so the total number of household is two and constant over time during any period in the 
economy. A household derives utility from consumption during young ytC  and consumption 
during old otC 1+ . The lifetime utility of generation t is  
 ot
y
tt CCU 1loglog ++= b . (15) 
where b  is the discount factor. During the first period, the young household is endowed with 
L units of labor and supply it inelastically. Households allocate wage income and transfers from 
the government to consumption and savings to maximize their lifetime utility. The young 
household allocates its savings to interest-bearing and pure bubble assets. The young will buy 
pure bubble assets only if they can resell them at a positive price to the unborn young of the 
next generation. In the second period, the household spends their savings on old-age 
consumption. Therefore, the budget constraints for generation t are expressed as follows:  
 ttttt
y
t LwmPSC t+=++ . (16) 
 ttt
o
t mPSrC 11 )1( ++ ++= . (17) 
where tS is the interest-bearing asset, tm is the demand for pure bubble assets, tP is the price 
of pure bubble assets at time t in real terms of final goods and 𝜏" is government transfer at 
time t. tt mP  is the real value of pure bubble assets at time t. To hold pure bubble assets in 
equilibrium, the price of pure bubble assets must satisfy the following arbitrage condition: 
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 r
P
P
t
t +=+ 11 , (18) 
Equation (18) implies that the rate of return on one unit of a pure bubble asset equals the rate 
of return on one unit of interest-bearing assets. Solving the households’ maximization problem, 
we obtain the following optimal plan for savings: 𝑆" + 𝑃"𝑚" = -./- 𝑤"𝐿 + 𝜏" .                       (19) 
2.2.5. Government 
Following Futagami and Shibata (2000), we consider the case where the government supplies 
an intrinsically useless asset to households. The government gives pure bubble assets to the old 
household of first generation (-1) at time 0 and keeps the expansion rate of pure bubble assets 
constant at rateµ , and distributes it to each household. That is, a new pure bubble asset is 
distributed to households as a lump-sum transfer payment. Then, the supply of pure bubble 
assets is 
 1)1( -+= tt MM µ , (20) 
where Mt is the total nominal supply of pure bubbly assets. The government’s flow budget 
constraint at period t in real terms of final goods is 
 1-= ttt MPµt . (21) 
2.2.6. Aggregate stock bubbles 
We define the market value of total stock assets at the beginning of period t as 
 　Attt
t
s
sst BNDNNtsVW +=-=å
-
-=
+
1
1
1 ))(,(  (22)  
where 𝐵"3 ≡ 𝐵(𝑠, 𝑡)(𝑁9/. − 𝑁9)";.9<;. . AtB  represents the aggregate stock bubble. 
In this study, new bubbles appear in the economy when the growth rate is strictly positive. 
Using the definition of AtB  and (14), we obtain the following dynamics of the aggregate stock 
bubble 
 ( ))()1( 11 ttAtAt NNBBrB -++= ++ . (23) 
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2.2.7. Equilibrium 
Consider the equilibrium dynamics of the economy. First, we derive the equilibrium dynamics 
of pure bubbles. The pure bubble equilibrium condition is: 
 tt Mm = . (24)  
Using the arbitrage condition (18), we have the dynamics of pure bubbles: 
 tttt MPrMP )1)(1(11 µ++=++ . (25) 
Using ttt
m
t NMPb /º , we obtain the dynamics of the normalized pure bubbles as follows:  
 mt
t
m
t bg
rb
+
++
=+ 1
)1)(1(
1
µ , (26) 
where tttt NNNg /)( 1 -º + is the growth rate of the variety. Next, we consider the dynamics 
of aggregate stock bubbles. Dividing (25) by Nt , we obtain the dynamics of the normalized 
aggregate stock bubbles as follows: 
 ( )tst
t
s
t Bgbg
rb +
+
+
=+ )1(
)1(
1 , (27)  
where 𝑏"9 ≡ 𝐵"3/𝑁" is the normalized aggregate stock bubble. For simply, we call sb  stock 
bubbles in the following. 
 Next, we derive the equilibrium growth rate of the production variety in this economy. The 
final goods market equilibrium condition is 
 Rttt
o
t
y
tt INxCCY +++= , (28) 
Using equation (23), we can obtain the following asset market equilibrium condition (the 
derivation is provided in Appendix A):3 
 )( 1 tt
A
ttt NNBDNS -++= +h . (29) 
Equation (29) implies that the interest-bearing assets consist of the existing stocks held by the 
old household at the beginning period t, D𝑁" + 𝐵"3, and the investing in the R&D sector. On 
                                                   
3 Tanaka and Iwaisako (2011) and Tanaka (2011) show an analogous asset market 
equilibrium condition. 
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the other hand, using (19) and (21), the holdings of the interest-bearing assets tS  can be given 
by: 
 tttt MPLwS -++
= )(
1
t
b
b . (30) 
By dividing equation (29) by Nt , and substituting (10) and (30) into (29), we can obtain the 
growth rate of the economy4:   
 
h
h st
m
t
t
babBg ---+G= ,  (31) 
where LA aa
a
aa
b
b ---
+
ºG 1
1
1
2
)1(
1
, 
)1)(1(
1
µb
µb
++
++
ºa . From the (31), the growth rate of the 
equilibrium in which pure and stock bubbles do not arise is given by: 
     g 𝑏A, 𝑏9 = 0 = C;D/EF ,     (32) 
where g(𝑏A, 𝑏9 = 0) is the growth rate of an economy in the bubble-less equilibrium in which 
pure and stock bubbles do not arise. We assume, like Oliver (2000) and Tanaka (2011), the 
following condition: 
  0)0,( 0 >--GÛ>= = pp
r
rbbg Bsn , (33)  
where 0=Br  denotes the market interest rate in the bubble-less equilibrium. As we see the later, 
this condition guarantees a positively valued stock bubble in equilibrium. From (31), we find 
a negative relationship between the growth rate and pure and stock bubbles ( st
m
t bb , ). This 
property is the crowding out effect of bubbles, as in Grossman and Yanagawa (1993). On the 
other hand, there is a positive relationship between the growth rate g" and the initial bubble 
B. This relationship represents the growth enhancing effect, as in Olivier (2000) and Tanaka 
(2011). 
                                                   
4 where we use LAYLw tt aa
a
aaa ---=-= 1
1
1
2
)1()1( 𝑁" 
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2.3. Pure and stock Bubbles 
2.3.1. The condition for pure and stock bubbles 
In this section, we derive the conditions under which pure and stock bubbles coexist in an 
equilibrium. From the dynamics of the pure bubbles described by equation (26), we obtain two 
types of steady states for pure bubbles: a positive pure bubble equilibrium ( bm > 0) and a pure 
bubble-less equilibrium (bm = 0).  
 First, we consider the case of bm=0, which means that only stock bubbles exist and pure 
bubbles do not arise in the steady state equilibrium, as in Tanaka (2011). We present the results 
in this scenario for later reference, though do not claim originality here. Using (31) and bm=0, 
the growth rate in the equilibrium in which only stock bubbles arise is 
  
h
h stm
t
bBbg --+G== )0( ,  (34) 
By substituting (13) and (34) into (27), we then have the dynamics of stock bubbles: 𝑏"/.9 = FG/H;IJK 1 + DF;H 𝐵 G/H;F;IJKF + 𝑏"9 .              (35) 
The dynamics described by equation (35) has two steady state equilibria with only stock 
bubbles. Let E1 and E2 be the steady states with stock bubbles, respectively.5 The effects of a 
change in the initial bubble (B) are quite different. In the steady state equilibrium, the following 
hold: 
    01 <
¶
¶
B
g , (E1) (36) 
    02 >
¶
¶
B
g , (E2) (37) 
Hence, in the steady state equilibrium E2 , the initial bubble (B) has growth enhancing effect.  
 Next, we investigate the condition for pure and stock bubbles to coexist in the equilibrium. 
First, suppose an expansion rate of pure bubbles of zero ( 0=µ ); then, the dynamics of a pure 
bubble is 
                                                   
5 See Appendix B for the mathematical derivation of the steady state equilibrium and its 
properties. 
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 mt
t
m
t bg
rb
+
+
=+ 1
1
1 , (38) 
The dynamics of pure bubbles (38) imply that, when the market interest rate equals the 
economy’s growth rate (𝑔 = 𝑟), pure bubbles can exist in a steady state equilibrium at a 
positive value (bm>0). Using equation (29), the steady state of stock bubbles is 
 
rg
Bgrbs
-
+
=
)1( . (39)  
Equation (39) implies that the steady state of stock bubbles can exist only if the economy’s 
growth rate is higher than the market interest rate (g > 𝑟). Hence, if the expansion rate of pure 
bubbles is zero ( 0=µ ), pure and stock bubbles do not coexist in the steady state equilibrium.  
 Next, we suppose a positive expansion rate of pure bubbles ( 0>µ ). Then, from (26), we 
obtain the following condition for pure bubbles to arise in the steady state equilibrium: 
 µµ rrbbg sm ++=> )0,( , (40)  
where 𝑔(𝑏A, 𝑏9 > 0) is the growth rate in the steady state equilibrium with pure and stock 
bubbles. The growth rate depends on the market interest rate and the expansion rate of pure 
bubbles. Equation (40) implies that the growth rate is higher than the market interest rate; thus, 
the steady state of an aggregate stock bubble is defined by positive value because the aggregate 
stock bubbles are positive when g > 𝑟 (See equation (39)). We can obtain the equilibrium 
stock bubble value by substituting (13) and (40) into (39) as follows: 
 ÷÷
ø
ö
çç
è
æ
++
-
= µµ
h
p
µ
)1(
B
Bbs . (41)  
By substituting (13), (40) and (41) into (31) and then rearranging the terms, we can obtain the 
value of equilibrium pure bubbles: 
 ÷÷
ø
ö
çç
è
æ
-
+
-÷÷
ø
ö
çç
è
æ
-
++-G=
B
B
Ba
bm
h
p
µ
µ
h
pµh )1(1)1(1  (42)  
From equation (42), a positive pure bubble equilibrium requires 
 
B
B
B -
+
+÷÷
ø
ö
çç
è
æ
-
++>G
h
p
µ
µ
h
pµh )1(1)1( . (43) 
Therefore, we have the following proposition: 
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Proposition 1: If the expansion rate of pure bubbles is zero ( 0=µ ) , pure and stock bubbles 
can not coexist in the steady state equilibrium. If the expansion rate of pure bubbles is positive
0>µ and equation (43) is satisfied, then pure and stock bubbles can coexist in an economy.  
 
2.3.2. The property of steady states 
This subsection analyzes the properties of the steady state equilibrium with pure and stock 
bubbles. In the steady state equilibrium with two types of bubbles, we can use equations (13) 
and (40), to obtain the following expression: 
 µµ
h
p
++
-
=> )1()0,(
B
bbg sm . (44)  
In the equilibrium with pure and stock bubbles, the growth rate positively depends on the 
initial bubble (B) and the expansion rate of pure bubbles (µ ). Here, we consider the effect of 
permanent change in the initial bubble (B) and the expansion rate of pure bubbles on the 
growth rate. Using equations (13), (41), (42), and (44), we obtain the followings: 
 0,0,0,0,0 >
¶
¶
>
¶
¶
<
¶
¶
>
¶
¶
>
¶
¶
µ
g
B
g
B
b
B
b
B
r ms . (45)  
Thus, in the steady state equilibrium with pure and stock bubbles, the initial bubble has a 
growth enhancing effect. A change in the initial bubble (B) has three effects on the growth rate. 
First, an increase the initial bubble increase the stock bubbles (bs), which strengthens the 
quantity of the crowding out effect of stock bubbles. Second, the initial bubble lowers the pure 
bubble, which weakens the crowding out effect of pure bubble on the growth rate. Finally, an 
increase in the initial bubble increase the return on investing in the R&D sector, and has a 
positive effect on the growth of variety; that is a growth enhancing effect. In the steady state 
equilibrium with pure and stock bubbles, the positive effects of the change in the initial bubble 
dominate the negative crowding out effect; hence, an increase the initial bubble enhances the 
growth rate. The increase in the pure bubble expansion rate ( µ ) increases the growth rate in 
the steady state equilibrium with both bubbles. Futagami and Shibata (2000) also find this 
positive effect on the growth rate in the steady state. When the government distributes a new 
pure bubble asset to households as a lump-sum transfer payment, households believe they are 
wealthier and want to save more. This leads to a higher economic growth rate with two types 
of bubbles. Therefore, we obtain the following proposition; 
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Proposition 2: In the steady state equilibrium with pure and stock bubbles, the initial bubble 
B and the expansion rate of pure bubblesμhave a growth enhancing effect.  
  
In addition, we can consider the effects of the interaction between two types of assets bubbles. 
From (44), we obtain the following property: 
 0
)( 2
2
>
-
=
¶¶
¶
BB
g
h
p
µ
. (46)  
In the steady state with pure and stock bubbles, the growth enhancing effect of the initial 
bubble (B) is increased by the expansion rate of pure bubbles (µ ). 
 
2.3.3.  Dynamics of the two types of bubbles 
This subsection analyzes the dynamics of the equilibrium path of pure and stock bubbles 
described by (26) and (27). We refer to the locus on the plane ( mt
s
t bb , ) representing 
m
t
m
t bb =+1
as the mb  locus and stst bb =+1  as the 
sb  locus. Substituting (13) and (31) into (26) gives the 
dynamics of pure bubbles: 
 mts
t
m
t
m
t
s
t
m
t
mm
t bBbabB
bbbbb ÷÷
ø
ö
çç
è
æ
-
+
--+G
+
=Û= ++ h
pµh 1)1(),( 11 . (47) 
We transform the dynamics above as follows: 
 
[ ]
ïî
ï
í
ì
=
++-+G+-ºW³
Û³+
0
)1)(1(11)(
1
m
t
s
t
s
t
m
tm
t
m
t
b
rB
a
b
a
bb
bb
µh
. (48) 
The mb  locus has two lines. Figure 1 shows the dynamics of pure bubbles (48). Using (13), 
(27), and (31), we can derive the dynamics of stock bubbles as follows; 𝑏"/.9 = 𝑏9 𝑏"A, 𝑏"9 ⟺ 𝑏"/.9 = FG/H;QIJR;IJK 1 + DF;H 𝐵 G/H;F;QIJR;IJKF + 𝑏"9 .    (49) 
Furthermore, using (49), we can get the following expression: 
( )
( ))1(
)1)(()1)((
)(
2
1 rBba
BrBbrBBbbbbb s
t
s
t
s
ts
t
m
t
s
t
s
t +-
+-+G-+--+G+-
ºF³Û³+
hh ,  (50) 
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Figure 2 shows the dynamics of stock bubbles (49). The steady state equilibrium with two 
types of asset bubbles is depicted at point E in the Figure 3. E1 and E2 denote the steady state 
equilibrium in which only stock bubbles only. We can show that the equilibrium path to point 
E, E1, and E2 are the saddle point, sink, and source in the neighborhood of steady state 
equilibrium, respectively. 
 Finally, we compare growth rates in steady states. Using (10), (31), and (32), we obtain 
the following relationship: 
       g(𝑏A, 𝑏9 > 0) = g 𝑏A, 𝑏9 = 0 − IK/IRF . (51) 
Because the second term of (51) is negative, we obtain the following relationship: 
 )0,()0,( =>= smsm bbgbbg .  (52) 
Thus, the growth rate in the steady state equilibrium with two types of bubbles is lower than 
that of a bubble-less steady state equilibrium.  
2.4. Conclusion 
In this chapter, we developed an overlapping-generation model with pure and stock bubbles 
and examined the conditions for the existence of both types. In contrast to previous studies that 
only consider one type of bubbles, we introduce two types into an endogenous growth model. 
We show both types can coexist in a steady state equilibrium. When the total supply of pure 
bubbles is constant, the existence of pure bubbles requires that the growth rate of the economy 
equal the market interest rate. On the other hand, stock bubbles can exist only if the growth 
rate is greater than the market interest rate. Thus, pure and stock bubbles can-not coexist in the 
equilibrium. However, if the total supply of pure bubbles grows at a constant rate, both can 
coexist in the economy. In addition, a steady state equilibrium with two types of bubbles has a 
growth enhancing effect. A permanent change in the initial bubble and an expansion of the 
pure bubble positively affects the growth rate. In addition, pure and stock bubbles interact. In 
a steady state equilibrium with pure and stock bubbles, the degree of the growth enhancing 
effect of the initial bubble depends on the expansion rate of the pure bubble.  
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Appendix 
Appendix A: Asset market equilibrium condition (29) derivation  
Using (1), (2), (6), and fact that 𝜋"T = 0 hold s in the equilibrium, the output of final goods is 
  t
x
tt xNpLwY += . (A1)  
Thus, we express the final goods market equilibrium condition as follows: 
 Rttt
o
t
y
tt
x
t INxCCxNpLw +++=+ , (A2) 
Using 𝜋 = (𝑝V − 1)𝑥, (9), (10), (16),(17),(20),(21) and (24), 𝑆" + 𝑃"𝑀" + 𝑝V − 1 𝑥𝑁" = 1 + 𝑟 𝑆";. + 𝑃"(1 + 𝜇)𝑀";. + 𝜂(𝑁"/. − 𝑁") 
 ⇔ 𝑆" + 𝜋𝑁" = 1 + 𝑟 𝑆";. + 𝜂(𝑁"/. − 𝑁") 
 ⇔ 𝑆" + 𝜋𝑁" = 1 + 𝑟 𝑆";. + (𝐷" + 𝐵)(𝑁"/. − 𝑁") ⇔ 𝑆" − 𝐷"𝑁"/. − 𝐵 𝑁"/. − 𝑁" = (1 + 𝑟)(𝑆";. − 𝐷";.𝑁")   (A3) 
Adding the term −𝐵"3, and using (14) and (23), we can express (A3) as follows: 
 𝑆" − 𝐷"𝑁"/. − 𝐵"3 − 𝐵 𝑁"/. − 𝑁" = (1 + 𝑟)[𝑆";. − 𝐷";.𝑁" − 𝐵";.3 − 𝐵 𝑁" − 𝑁";. ] 
Because initial assets are given by 𝑆;. = (𝐷;.+𝐵)𝑁^, we can have (29) for any period t. 
Appendix B: Mathematical derivation of the steady state equilibrium with stock 
bubbles. 
we can transform equation (35) as follows: 𝑓 𝑏9 = 𝑏9` − Γ − DE − 𝜋 + 𝐵 𝑏9 + Γ − DE 1 + 𝑟 𝐵.          (B1) 
Equation (B1) has the following solutions; 
 
2
)/)(1(4)/()/( 2 BrrBrBr
bs
ppppp -G+-+--G±+--G
= . (B2)  
Equation (B2) has dual stationary stock bubbles equilibria if the following three conditions 
are satisfied: 
 
0)/)(1(4)/(
0)/()0(
0/)0(
2 >-G+-+--G=
<+--G-=¢
>-G=
BrrBrF
Brf
rf
ppp
pp
p
 (B3)  
where F is the determinant of (B2). We assume the following condition, as in Oliver (2000) 
and Tanaka (2011): 
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  0)0,( 0 >--GÛ>= = pp
r
rbbg Bsn , (B4)  
where g(𝑏A, 𝑏9 = 0) and 0=Br  denote the growth rate and the market interest rate in the 
bubble-less equilibrium, respectively. This condition guarantees a positively valued stock 
bubble in equilibrium. Using (B4), we can verify that 0)0( >f  and 0)0( <¢f . The sign of 
the determinant F depends on the size of initial bubble (B). We can show the following: 
  0)( <¢ BF  and )0(F  (B5)  
This implies that the sign of the determinant is positive for a relatively small value of the 
initial bubble.  
Appendix C: The dynamics of aggregate stock bubbles (47) 
Differentiating (51) with respect to sb  yields: 
  
( )2)1(
)1(1)(
rBba
Brr
a
b
s
s
+-
+
+-=F¢
h . (C1)  
From equation (C1), we obtain the following: 
  
)1()1(
)1()1(0)(
2
1
rBrrBb
rBrrBbb
s
ss
+-+=
+++=Û=F¢
h
h
　　　　　　　　
 (C2) 
Additionally, from (C2), the following condition are satisfied: 
  
0)1(
0)1(
2
2
>Û+<
<Û+>
s
s
brBr
brBr
h
h
 (C3) 
Figure 4 shows illustrates (C1). 
Differentiating (C2) with respect to sb , yields 
  
( )3)1(
)1(2)(
rBba
rBrb
s
s
+-
+
-=F ¢¢
h . (C4) 
The sign of (C4) is: 
  
0)()1(
)()1(
0)()1(
<F ¢¢Û+>
¥=F ¢¢Û+=
>F ¢¢Û+<
ss
ss
ss
brBb
brBb
brBb
 (C5) 
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Using the definition of the normalized aggregate stock bubble (𝑏9), 𝑏9 > (1 + 𝑟)𝐵 holds in 
this economy. The 𝑏9	locus represents the inverse -U shape in the region 𝑏9 > (1 + 𝑟)𝐵.  
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3. Bubbles and unemployment in an endogenous growth model† 
3.1. Introduction 
Economic bubbles have occurred throughout history, often with major impacts on the 
economies of the countries concerned. These bubbles are frequently observed when economic 
activities are booming and GDP growth rates are high (Martin and Ventura, 2012; Farmer and 
Schelnast, 2013, ch. 6). Indeed, empirical studies have shown that there is a negative 
relationship between stock market wealth and unemployment. For example, the US stock 
market boom of the 1990s was accompanied by a reduction in the unemployment rate (Phelps, 
1999). In addition, a similar correlation between the stock market and unemployment has been 
found to hold for numerous European countries (Fitoussi et al., 2000). Kunieda and Shibata 
(2016) provide historical observations of the negative correlation between asset bubbles and 
economic recessions for Japan and the US. Despite this empirical evidence, however, no study 
has addressed the theoretical relationships among unemployment, asset bubbles, and economic 
growth. The purpose of this study is to examine these relationships analytically. 
 In his seminal study, Tirole (1985) examines the effects of bubbles on intrinsically useless 
assets in an overlapping generations model. Grossman and Yanagawa (1993), King and 
Ferguson (1993), and Futagami and Shibata (2000) extend Tirole’s (1985) model to an 
endogenous growth framework. These scholars re-examine the necessary conditions for the 
existence of bubbles and investigate the relationship between bubbles and economic growth. 
These studies find that when asset bubbles occur, they divert savings from capital accumulation 
and thereby retard economic growth. Taking an alternative approach, Olivier (2000) considers 
bubbles that are tied to capital goods, rather than useless assets, and shows that bubbles can 
have a positive effect on economic growth. A key feature of the above studies is that they do 
not consider the influences of unemployment. 
 There is now a broad literature which argues that unemployment is created by frictions in 
the labour market. Diamond (1982), Mortensen (1982), and Pissarides (1985) develop search 
and matching models of unemployment, which scholars have since applied in a wide variety 
of fields. 6  Eriksson (1997) introduces labour market frictions into the standard dynamic 
                                                   
† This chapter is based on Hashimoto and Im (2016): “Bubbles and unemployment in an 
endogenous growth model”, Oxford Economic Papers, 68 (4), pp. 1084-106. 
6 See Pissarides (2000) for an introduction to search friction models. 
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optimizing (Ramsey) model with capital stock externalities generated by learning by doing that 
ensure long-run economic growth. He then examines the effects of various policies (e.g., capital 
taxes and unemployment benefits) on economic growth and unemployment.7  
 Unlike the overlapping-generations model, rational bubbles cannot be generated in an 
infinitely-lived, representative-agent (Ramsey-type) model (Tirole, 1985; Santos and 
Woodford, 1997).8 Other strands of the literature on asset bubbles with rational agents take a 
microeconomic approach. Allen et al. (1993), Conlon (2004), and Doblas-Madrid (2012) 
examine bubbles based on market-timing games under asymmetric information. Allen and 
Gorton (1993), Allen and Gale (2000), and Barlevy (2014) develop models of credit-driven 
bubbles by focusing on agency problems. 9  These studies, however, do not treat the 
determinants of unemployment and economic growth endogenously. 
 To the best of our knowledge, no study has introduced an endogenous growth model to 
analyse the relationship between asset bubbles and unemployment. To fill this void, this paper 
presents a theoretical framework to examine the necessary conditions for the existence of 
bubbles in an economy with endogenous unemployment, and to investigate the relationships 
between unemployment, bubbles, and economic growth. To this end, we merge the endogenous 
growth and labour market friction approach of Eriksson (1997) with the continuous-time 
overlapping-generations model of Weil (1989). 
 In our framework, unemployment arises as result of labour market frictions, and labour 
market efficiency is reflected in the interest rate, as the marginal productivity of capital 
influences the interest rate. Because asset returns are linked with the interest rate, the existence 
of asset bubbles depends on labour market conditions. Specifically, we find that unemployment 
is a key factor in the existence of bubbles; when the unemployment rate is relatively low and 
the interest rate is high, asset bubbles may exist in equilibrium. We define two equilibrium 
regimes: a “bubble” regime that features multiple equilibria which may or may not exhibit asset 
                                                   
7 See Bean and Pissarides (1993), Aghion and Howitt (1994), Caballero and Hammour 
(1996), and Haruyama and Leith (2010) for alternative models addressing the role of labour 
market frictions in the relationship between growth and unemployment. 
8 As Santos and Woodford (1997) point out, it is difficult to generate rational bubbles in an 
infinitely-lived agent model without market frictions. For an approach that focuses on financial 
market frictions, see Hirano and Yanagawa (2010) and Martin and Ventura (2012). These 
studies examine the existence of bubbles and find that bubbles can be growth-enhancing or 
growth-impairing, depending on the restrictiveness of the collateral constraint. 
9 See Brunnermeier and Oehmke (2015) for a survey of the theoretical literature on bubbles. 
27 
 
bubbles and a “non-bubble” regime in which bubbles never occur. We show that bubbles divert 
savings away from physical capital accumulation and lower the output growth rate, a result 
which supports a common finding in the literature. Comparing the bubble regime with the non-
bubble regime, however, we find that the rate of output growth is always higher under the 
former than under the latter. 
 Finally, we use the framework to study the effects of changes in labour market policy and 
model parameters on unemployment, asset bubbles, and economic growth. For example, we 
find that, because unemployment benefits raise the value of unemployment, they negatively 
influence employment, a standard conclusion of models with search frictions. Thus, reducing 
unemployment benefits increases the employment rate, making the labour market more 
efficient, raising the interest rate, and consequently shifting the economy from the non-bubble 
regime to the bubble regime. In this case, there is a negative relationship between 
unemployment and economic growth.10  
 The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the features of the 
model. Section 3 describes the steady-state equilibrium with and without bubbles. In Section 
4, the effects of policy and parameter changes under the two regimes on bubbles, economic 
growth, and unemployment are examined. Section 5 briefly discusses the implications of the 
results. Section 6 concludes. 
3.2. The Model 
Consider an economy with a number of infinitely-lived dynastic households. At each moment 
in time, new and identical dynastic households appear at a rate n. Thus, normalizing the size of 
each household to unity and setting the total initial population N0, the total population of 
households at time t is Nt = N0ent. For the remainder of the paper, we suppress time notation 
when it is not required for the exposition. 
3.2.1. Matching 
In the labour market, unemployed workers and firms with vacant positions strive to find each 
other. In our framework, unemployment is generated by matching frictions. Denoting the 
                                                   
10  Many empirical studies find a negative relationship between unemployment and 
economic growth (Ball and Moffitt, 2001; Muscatelli and Tirelli, 2001; Staiger et al., 2001; 
Tripier, 2006; Pissarides and Vallanti, 2007). 
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number of successful matches between unemployed workers and firms as f, the matching 
process is described by the following matching function: 
  f (uN, uN),  
where u and u represent the unemployment rate and the vacancy rate. As such, uN is the number 
of unemployed workers and uN is the number of vacant jobs in the economy. Following the 
standard assumptions of the search literature,11 the matching function is assumed to be concave, 
homogeneous of degree one, and increasing in both of its arguments. Defining the tightness of 
the labour market as 
 
uuN
N u
=
u
ºq ,   
the probability that a firm with vacancies is matched with an unemployed worker has the 
following property:  
 )(1,1),( qº÷
ø
ö
ç
è
æ
q
=
u
u qf
N
NuNf , where 0)( <
q¶
q¶q .  
3.2.2. Firms 
We assume that the number of firms equals the number of households N. The production 
function of firm j is described by  
 a-a= 1)( jjj lkAky , 0 < a < 1,  
where A, kj, and lj represent the productivity, capital stock, and number of workers employed 
by firm j. Labour productivity is captured by k , and is assumed to rise over time as a result 
of spillovers that emanate from the firm’s accumulated investment per worker, similar to the 
spillovers proposed by Romer (1986). To ensure the existence of a long-run growth path, we 
assume that k  takes the form Ndjkk
N
j ÷ø
öç
è
æ= ò0 , which represents the average capital stock. 
 To create matches, firm j must advertise its job vacancies. If firm j has nj vacancies, then 
q(q)nj workers are hired by firm j at each moment of time.12 Furthermore, firm j fires or loses 
                                                   
11 See Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) for a discussion on matching functions. 
12 As q is a given for all firms, the probability q(q) is the same for all firms. 
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workers at a rate of δlj, where d represents the exogenous separation rate. Summing these two 
flows, the labour force size changes according to the following equation: 
 jjj lvql d-q= )(! , (1) 
where a dot over a variable denotes differentiation with respect to time. In accordance with 
Eriksson (1997), Mortensen and Pissarides (1999), and Pissarides and Vallanti (2007), the cost 
of recruiting a worker for a vacancy is assumed to be proportional to the wage rate, gw, where 
w is the wage rate and g is a cost parameter.13 To keep the model simple, we do not consider 
an adjustment cost for investment. Then, firm j’s profit maximization problem can be written 
as 
 ( )ò
¥ i-òg--- i
t
dr
jjjj diewvwlrky
i
tmax , subject to (1), (2) 
where r represents the interest rate.  
3.2.3. Households 
We model households following the approach of Weil (1989). Although the first generation 
has an initial set of assets, new households enter the economy with no asset wealth. The first 
generation of households is distinguished from those born at time 0 (denoted 0+) by denoting 
them as 0-. The lifetime utility of a representative household in generation s is given by 
ò
¥ -r-
t
ti dieisc )(),(ln , where c(s, t) represents the consumption of generation s at time t, and r is 
the subjective discount rate.  
 To eliminate any uncertainty regarding employment, the model assumes that each 
household has a large number of members normalized to unity, with (1-u) employed members 
and u unemployed members. Then, each household receives an expected wage income from 
production of w(1-u) and unemployment benefits of lwu, which are proportional to the wage 
rate, l Î (0, 1). Each household allocates its total assets (z) between physical capital (k) and 
the bubble asset (m), where the bubble asset is an intrinsically useless paper asset, specifically 
money. The price of the bubble asset in terms of goods (1/p) must satisfy the arbitrage condition 
)/1/()/1( pp! = - pp /! = r or, rather, the return on one unit of the bubble asset must equal r. This 
                                                   
13 This assumption is required to ensure a balanced growth path. 
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relationship leads to the following flow/stock budget constraint expressed in terms of real 
goods:14  
              
t
tsz
d
),(d = rz(s, t) + w(1 - u) + lwu + vI - t - c(s, t),                (3) 
 z(s, t) = k(s, t) + m(s, t),  
where z(s, t) represents the total asset holdings of generation s at time t, t is a lump-sum tax, 
and vI is the income from vacancies defined as vI = Ndjwv
N
j ÷ø
öç
è
æ gò0 . Thus, the optimization 
problem of a representative household in generation s is given by 
 ò
¥ -r-
t
ti dieisc )(),(lnmax , subject to (3).   (4) 
3.2.4. Government 
The government supplies a useless paper asset, B, which is priced in terms of goods at 1/p. We 
define the real value of the supply of this asset as M º B/p. The government gives the asset to 
the first generation (0-) at time 0 and continues to supply it to each household at a constant rate 
of µ (= BB /! ). Since the government’s real revenue is the sum of the lump-sum tax (tN) plus 
the bubble expansion (µM), and its expenditure is the unemployment benefit (lwuN), the 
government budget constraint is 
 tN + µM = lwuN.   (5) 
3.2.5. Market clearing conditions 
The aggregate variable Xt is defined as follows (Weil, 1989): 
 ò+º -
t ns
t dsNnetsxNtxX 0 00
1 ),(),0( .    
Using the above definition, we formulate the economy-wide dynamics for total assets and 
bubble assets as follows: 
 CNrZZ -w+=! ,   (6) 
 MrM )( +µ=! ,   (7) 
                                                   
14 See Appendix 1 for a detailed explanation of the derivation of the flow/stock budget 
constraint. 
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where Z = K + M and w º w(1 - u) + gwv + µM/N. See Appendix 2 for the derivations of the 
above equations. Total output is defined as Y º ò
N
jdjy0 . Therefore, the goods market 
equilibrium condition is15 
 KCY !+= , (8) 
where the left side is total output (Y) and the right side comprises aggregate consumption (C) 
and capital accumulation (K! ). 
3.2.6. Definition of equilibrium on a balanced growth path 
In this section, we provide a definition for the balanced growth path of the economy. An 
equilibrium consists of prices (r, p, w) and allocations for firms (kj, lj, vj) and for households 
(c(s, t), z(s, t)). These variables must satisfy the following conditions: (i) firms solve the 
optimization problem in (2), (ii) households solve the optimization problem in (4), (iii) the 
governmental budget constraint (5) holds, (iv) the goods market (8) clears, and (v) the wage is 
determined by negotiation between workers and firms (as given in (16) and discussed in 
Subsection 2.7).  
 A balanced growth path in a steady state is an equilibrium in which the interest rate (r), 
unemployment rate (u), and labour market tightness (q º u/u) are constant over time, whereas 
total output, aggregate consumption, and physical capital grow at the same rate, while 
aggregate supply (Y) and aggregate demand (C andK! ) grow proportionally. 
3.2.7. Solving the model  
In this subsection, we solve the optimization problems for households and firms. First, consider 
the optimization problem (4) of a representative household in generation s. The solution to the 
inter-temporal optimization problem is the Euler equation: 
 ),()(
d
),(d tscr
t
tsc
r-= ,   (9) 
with the transversality condition given by lim 0),( =ò
-
¥®
t
s i
dir
t etsz . Using (3) and (9), we obtain 
the following consumption function:  
                                                   
15 See Appendix 3 for the derivation of (8). 
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 c(s, t) = r[z(s, t) + ht],   (10) 
where ( )ò
¥ i-òt-+l+-º i
t
dr
i
I
iiiiit dievuwuwh
i
s)1( . 
Then, aggregating the Euler equation yields the following economy-wide dynamic equation:16 
 ZnCnrC r-+r-= )(! .   (11) 
 Next, we consider firm j’s profit maximization problem (2). This inter-temporal 
maximization problem can be solved using the current-value Hamiltonian function H = (yj - 
rkj - wlj - gwvj) + c(q(q)vj - dlj), where c is the current shadow value of labour. Assuming that 
the market shares are small enough that each firm takes average capital ( k ) and market 
tightness (q) as constants, the first-order conditions are ¶H/¶kj = 0, ¶H/¶nj = 0, and ¶H/¶lj = rc 
-c! . Combining these conditions yields 
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!! . (13) 
All firms are considered identical because of the symmetry in production technology and, as 
such, k = kj = k in equilibrium. Moreover, the vacancy rate is equal to the number of firm j’s 
vacancies, u º Ndjv
N
j ÷ø
öç
è
æò0 = vj = v. Thus, the tightness of the labour market is determined by 
the ratio of the number of vacancies per firm to the unemployment rate, q (º uN/uN) = v/u. 
Furthermore, from the definition of the employment rate, we have 
 lNdjlu
N
j =÷ø
öç
è
æº- ò01 . (14) 
As a result, per capita output can be written as a--= 1)1( uAky , and the total output Y (º ò
N
jdjy0
= yN) becomes 
 a--= 1)1( uAKY .   (15) 
                                                   
16 See Appendix 2 for the derivation of (11). 
33 
 
 Following previous studies that address search frictions (Pissarides, 2000), we assume that 
a given worker and a given firm negotiate wages after they meet. When a match is made, the 
firm employs the worker in production and saves on the vacancy cost. Hence, the upper 
boundary of the wage is the marginal benefit of labour, which is determined by the marginal 
product and the marginal value of the saved vacancy cost (¶y/¶l + qgw).17 The lower boundary, 
on the other hand, is a worker’s opportunity income; in other words, the unemployment benefit, 
lw. It is assumed that negotiation between a firm and a worker results in a wage somewhere 
between these two extremes (Eriksson, 1997), such that w = (1 - b)lw + b(¶y/¶l + qgw), where 
b Î (0, 1) denotes the worker’s bargaining power.18 Consequently, the wage rate can be 
expressed as follows: 
 
j
j
l
y
w
¶
¶
×
bgq-lb--
b
=
)1(1
.  (16)  
3.2.8. The steady state conditions 
Using (1) and (14) in conjunction with the definition v = qu yields u! = - qq(q)u + d(1 - u). 
Consequently, the following labour market equilibrium condition is satisfied in the steady state:  
 
)(qq+d
d
=
q
u , (17) 
where ¶u/¶d > 0 and ¶u/¶q < 0.19 This expression represents the Beveridge curve, which 
implies that the unemployment rate rises when the separation rate increases or the labour 
market becomes less tight.  
 Also, based on (12) and using (14) and the fact that k = kj = k, the interest rate can be 
written as 
                                                   
17 The upper boundary on the wage can be derived as follows: ¶(y - gwv)/¶l with v = qu = 
q(1 - l). This is consistent with the marginal benefit of labour with an internalized 
unemployment rate. 
18 This formulation of the wage equation is broadly used in the literature on unemployment 
that includes search frictions (Aghion and Howitt, 1994; Caballero and Hammour, 1996; 
Eriksson, 1997). See Pissarides (2000) and Hall (2005) for discussions on the determination of 
the wage equation.  
19 Based on the matching function property provided in Section 2.1, we have ¶(qq(q))/¶q > 
0, which implies ¶u/¶q < 0. 
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 a--a= 1)1( uAr . (18) 
Therefore, a negative relationship between the unemployment rate and the interest rate is easily 
confirmed.  
 The growth rate of total output is defined as g YY /!º . Then, based on (14)-(16) and the 
fact that ¶y/¶l = (1 - a)y/l, in a steady state where u and q are constant, the wage growth rate 
equals the per capita output growth rate ( nYYyy -= // !! ), such that 
     ww /! = g - n.                   
As such, substituting the above equation and (16) into (13) yields 
 ngrq +-d+=qú
û
ù
ê
ë
é
q-
bg
l-b- )()1)(1( . (19)  
 The variables normalized by aggregate output are defined as c º C/Y and m º M/Y. Using 
the definitions (c, m), the fact that Z = K + M, as well as (7), (11), and (15), and recalling that 
the steady-state levels of c and m are constant when gYYKKCC === /// !!!  are on a 
balanced growth path, we derive the following equilibrium conditions: 
 0
)1(
1)( 1 =÷÷
ø
ö
çç
è
æ
+
-
r--+r- a- muA
ncgnr , (20) 
  (µ + r - g)m = 0.   (21) 
Then, dividing (8) by Y and using (15) and (18) yields the consumption-output ratio as 
 
r
gc a-= 1 .   (22) 
From this expression, it is clear that g < r/a is required for a positive consumption-output ratio 
(c > 0). Together (17)-(22) give the equilibrium values of c, m, g, r, u, and q. 
 Considering the case in which the population growth rate is zero (n = 0), as in a 
representative-agent (Ramsey) model with one dynasty (Eriksson, 1997), we can easily confirm 
that g = r - r for c > 0, based on (20). Consequently, based on (21), the value of the asset 
bubble must become zero (m = 0). As a result, asset bubbles cannot exist in equilibrium in a 
Ramsey-type representative-agent model. 
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3.3. The conditions for and consequences of bubbles 
3.3.1. The conditions for bubbles 
This section derives the conditions required for asset bubbles to exist in equilibrium. Under a 
bubble regime, there are two possible types of steady states: a positive bubble equilibrium (m 
> 0), and a bubble-less equilibrium (m = 0). Using (21), we obtain the aggregate output growth 
rate (g) associated with a positive bubble as 
 g = r + µ.   (23)  
In a positive bubble equilibrium, the output growth rate depends positively on the interest rate 
and the bubble expansion rate. 
 The equilibrium bubble value can be found by substituting (18), (22), and (23) into (20), 
and reorganizing the result: 
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Given the unemployment rate, u (which determines the interest rate (18)), both the aggregate 
output growth rate and the bubble satisfy (23) and (24). Based on the first equality in (24), a 
positive value of m requires n - r - µ > 0 under the condition r/a > g necessary for c > 0 from 
(22). From the second equality, the positive bubble equilibrium requires  
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.   (25)     
Then, using r = a--a 1)1( uA from (18), we can derive the following condition on the 
unemployment rate for a positive bubble equilibrium:         
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Thus, from (26) we have the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 1: If (26) is satisfied in equilibrium, then bubbles can exist in the economy; if not, 
then bubbles cannot exist.  
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If the equilibrium unemployment rate is below the threshold u , and the interest rate is greater 
than r , bubble assets exist in equilibrium.  
 Under full employment (u = 0), because the interest rate is determined solely by production 
parameters, r = aA, the existence of bubbles depends fully on the condition aA > r .20 With 
labour market frictions, however, the growth rate and the interest rate are contingent on the 
unemployment rate. Thus, the unemployment rate plays a crucial role in determining whether 
or not bubbles occur. When the equilibrium unemployment is less (higher) than the threshold 
level u , bubbles can (cannot) arise. The following subsection examines the equilibrium 
unemployment rate in detail. 
3.3.2. Equilibrium in the non-bubble regime 
This subsection considers the steady-state equilibrium of the non-bubble regime. Using (18), 
(20), and (22), the growth rate in the non-bubble regime is denoted as gNB, and defined as 
 gNB = G(r)  Û  0)( =r-÷
ø
ö
ç
è
æ
a
-r+-- nrgnrg ,       (27)  
where G(0) < 0.21 In equilibrium, g < r + n - r must be satisfied because g < r/a. In addition, 
taking the total derivative of (27), we have the following property for G(r): 
 1
)()/(
/)()/()( >
-r-++-a
a-r-++-a
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¶
¶
=G¢
gnrgr
gnrgr
r
gr . 
Furthermore, using (23) and (27), it can be confirmed that, at the threshold level r  given in 
(25), the growth rate in the non-bubble regime is equivalent to the growth rate in the bubble 
regime; that is, g = r + µ = G( r ), as shown in Figure 1. 
	 	 Next, the equilibrium unemployment rate determines the interest rate r = r(u; A) 
aa --º 1)1( uA . It is clear from (17) that q = q(u; d), with ¶q/¶u < 0 and ¶q/¶d > 0. Then, 
substituting (27) and r = r(u; A) into (19), the equilibrium unemployment rate in the non-bubble 
regime (uNB) is determined by 
       ),,;(),,,;( nAuu NBR
NB
L dF=dglbF ,                    (28)  
                                                   
20 See King and Ferguson (1993) and Futagami and Shibata (2000) for discussions on the 
conditions required for the existence of bubbles in an endogenous growth model with full 
employment (and no labour market frictions). 
21 See Appendix 4 for the explicit expression of G(r). 
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 where ));(();()1)(1(),,,;( dqú
û
ù
ê
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é
dq-
bg
l-b-
ºdglbF NBNBNBL uquu ,   
 nAurAurnAu NBNBNBR +G-+ºF ));(();(),,;( dd ,  
0)( >F¢ uL , and 0)( >F¢ uR . 
 Defining Y(u) º FL(u) - FR(u), we have Y(0) < 0 and Y(1) > 0. Furthermore, assuming 
that the equilibrium is unique, we find that Y¢(u) > 0 (F¢L(u) > F¢R(u)) must be satisfied. Figure 
2 (a) shows the equilibrium unemployment rate for the non-bubble regime at Point ENB. 
Furthermore, the intersection of FR(u) and d + n - µ gives the threshold level of u  in (26), 
since gNB = g = r  + µ at the threshold unemployment rate u . From (18) and (27), we derive 
the equilibrium interest rate and growth rate for the non-bubble regime: rNB = aA(1- uNB)1-a 
and gNB = G(rNB). These relationships are depicted at Point ENB in Figure 3. 
3.3.3. Equilibrium in the bubble regime 
This subsection analyses the properties of the bubble regime, under which there are two 
equilibria: the positive bubble equilibrium (B) and the bubble-less equilibrium (N). The 
variables in this regime are denoted as Bu i , 
Bri , and 
Bg i , where i = (B, N). The variables 
associated with the bubble-less equilibrium are given by BNu , 
B
Nr , and 
B
Ng , and are equivalent 
to those of the non-bubble regime described in Subsection 3.2. The bubble-less equilibrium 
unemployment rate ( BNu ) is given by FL(u) = FR(u) and shown at Point 
B
NE  in Figure 2 (b). 
Then, the equilibrium interest rate and growth rate, BNr = aA(1-
B
Nu )
1-a and BNg = G(
B
Nu ), are 
obtained from (18) and (27). This relationship is depicted at Point BNE  in Figure 3. 
 Next, we consider the unemployment rate for the positive bubble equilibrium. When there 
is a positive bubble, the growth rate is BBg  = r + µ. Substituting this expression into (20), the 
equilibrium condition for the unemployment rate ( BBu ) is obtained as 
 µ-+d=dglbF nuBBL ),,,;( . (29) 
As shown at Point BBE  in Figure 2 (b), the unemployment rate associated with the positive 
bubble equilibrium is larger than that of the bubble-less equilibrium; that is, BBu  > 
B
Nu , which 
implies that BBr  < 
B
Nr . The interest rate and growth rate of the positive bubble equilibrium are 
B
Br = aA(1-
B
Bu )
1-a and BBg = 
B
Br + µ. This relationship is depicted at Point 
B
BE  in Figure 3. 
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3.4. Policy implications 
This section analyses how changes in labour market policy, productivity in production, and the 
supply of bubbles in the asset market affect the unemployment rate and the growth rate. 
3.4.1. Comparative statics 
The properties of the equilibrium level of u, depending on various parameters, including β, λ, 
γ, δ, A, and n can be examined with (28) and (29). Using FR and FL, as defined in (28), we 
obtain the following conditions: 
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See Appendix 5 for explicit expressions of the above conditions.  
 First, we consider the non-bubble regime by calculating the following partial derivatives 
of uNB: 
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The result, using (30) in conjunction with (18) and (27), is 
   sign
i
g NB
¶
¶  = sign
i
r NB
¶
¶
= sign 
i
u NB
¶
¶
- ,   (for i = nA,,,,, dglb ).    (31)  
Thus, we can derive the following proposition from (30) and (31). 
 
Proposition 2: In the non-bubble regime, the bargaining power of labour (b), unemployment 
benefits (l), the vacancy cost (g), the separation rate (d), and the population growth rate (n) 
all serve to increase the unemployment rate, so that the equilibrium interest rate and output 
growth rate fall. Productivity (A), on the other hand, decreases the unemployment rate, so that 
the equilibrium interest and output growth rates rise. 
 
Intuitively, an increase in the bargaining power of workers (b) leads to higher wages, implying 
reduced incentives for job creation and a smaller number of vacancies offered by firms. The 
result is a decrease in the tightness of the labour market (q = v/u) and an increase in the steady-
39 
 
state unemployment rate. Increases in the vacancy cost (g) and unemployment benefits (l) have 
similar effects to those described above. In addition, a rise in the separation rate (d) shifts the 
Beveridge curve down, raising unemployment. These results conform to those of the standard 
search friction model (Pissarides, 2000). 
 From Section 2.8, because the wage growth rate is negatively related with the population 
growth rate, ww /! = g - n, an increase in the population growth rate dampens wage growth, 
lowering future vacancy costs. As a result, firms postpone the creation of vacancies, and the 
labour market contracts, causing a rise in the unemployment rate. On the other hand, an 
improvement in productivity (A) directly increases the growth rate, and thereby raises future 
vacancy costs. As such, firms increase the current number of vacancies, and the unemployment 
rate falls. 
 Changes in the parameters ),,,,( ndglb  that lead to an increase the unemployment rate 
will also have a negative effect on the interest rate and the growth rate (see (18) and (27)). A 
rise in productivity (A) has direct and indirect effects that both lead to an increase in the interest 
rate and accelerate output growth. 
 Next, consider the case of an economy with bubbles. Using (29), the partial derivatives of 
B
Bu  are obtained as follows: 
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Then, using (32) in conjunction with (18) and (23), we have 
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Consequently, we can derive the following proposition using (32) and (33). 
 
Proposition 3: In the positive bubble equilibrium, the bargaining power of labour (b), 
unemployment benefits (l), the vacancy cost (g), the separation rate (d), and the population 
growth rate (n) increase the unemployment rate so that the equilibrium interest rate and output 
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growth rate fall. Productivity (A) has a positive effect on the equilibrium interest rate and 
output growth rate, but the unemployment rate is not affected. The bubble expansion rate (µ), 
on the other hand, decreases the unemployment rate and increases the equilibrium interest rate 
and output growth rate. 
 
The effects of b, l, g, d, and n on unemployment, the interest rate, and the output growth rate 
are all analogous to those for the non-bubble regime. However, because the relationship 
between the interest rate and the growth rate is given by g = r + µ in an economy with bubbles 
(23), the job creation curve in (19) or (29) is free of the effect of productivity (A). Thus, 
productivity has no effect on the unemployment rate. Consequently, the interest rate is affected 
by the direct positive effect of productivity so that it increases the growth rate of output. 
 The bubble expansion rate (µ) has two positive effects on the output growth rate. The first 
occurs directly, by means of an increase in asset holdings (asset effect) (Futagami and Shibata, 
2000), which shifts the BBg  = 
B
Br  + µ curve upward. Furthermore, this increase in economic 
growth increases growth in wages, which, in turn, increases the number of operating vacancies 
so that the unemployment rate falls. The second effect stems from the improvement in 
employment, which induces economic growth through an increase in the interest rate. This 
effect moves the positive bubble economy along the BBg  curve at interest rate 
B
Br . Figure 4 
depicts how the presence of bubbles makes BBE  (the bubble economy) approach 
B
NE  (the 
bubble-less economy). 
 In addition, the effects of an interaction between the two types of policies (labour market 
policy and bubble supply policy) can be considered. Based on the above results, a decrease in 
the bubble supply, implemented with the aim of moderating asset bubbles, lowers the 
employment rate and economic growth. On the other hand, a decrease in unemployment 
benefits could improve the employment rate and economic growth. Therefore, labour market 
policies could weaken the negative effects of the bubble supply on the employment rate and 
economic growth. Thus, when devising policies, policy makers should consider the extent to 
which labour market policies’ effects on the employment rate and economic growth depend on 
the effects of bubble supply policies and vice versa in a macroeconomy.  
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3.4.2. Comparison of the two regimes 
The economy will be in a non-bubble or bubble regime when the equilibrium unemployment 
rate is higher or lower, respectively, than the threshold level. Thus, if changes in policies or 
parameters cause a decrease in the unemployment rate (e.g., a reduction in unemployment 
benefits), the economy will shift from a non-bubble regime to a bubble regime. As shown in 
Figure 3, the output growth rate is always higher under the bubble regime than under the non-
bubble regime, even when bubbles occur. 
 Additionally, under a bubble regime, steady-state equilibrium can be achieved in either the 
presence or absence of bubbles (Tirole, 1985). As for equilibrium unemployment, the 
relationship uuu BB
B
N <<  holds under the bubble regime. Thus, the conditions rrr
B
B
B
N >>  
and BB
B
N gg >  are satisfied. Regarding the growth rate, bubbles create a crowd-out effect by 
reducing capital accumulation (Grossman and Yanagawa, 1993; Futagami and Shibata 2000).  
 The above properties can be formally restated as follows:  
 
Proposition 4: The growth rate ( NBg ) in a non-bubble regime ( uu > ) is lower than the 
growth rate ( Bg i ) in a bubble regime ( uu < ); that is, BNB gg i< . Under a bubble regime, the 
growth rate is lower when there are bubbles ( BBg ) than when there are not (
B
Ng ); that is, 
B
N
B
B gg < . 
 
3.5. Discussion 
3.5.1. Related literature on bubbles with labour market frictions 
This paper responds to the literature on asset pricing models with labour market frictions. 
Regarding empirical and theoretical studies on asset pricing and unemployment, Kuehn et al. 
(2012) develop a model with a stock market and a labour market search mechanism in a 
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium framework, and investigate the correlation between the 
equity premium (stock market volatility) and labour market tightness. Farmer (2012) also 
provides an empirical and theoretical study of the relationship between the stock market crash 
of 2008 and the Great Recession in the US, and finds a strong correlation between 
unemployment and the price of capital. Miao et al. (2016) observe a historical relationship 
between monthly price-earnings ratio data and the unemployment rate during recessions in the 
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US, and investigate the relationship between unemployment and stock market bubbles in an 
economy with labour and financial market frictions. 
 Direct comparisons of our results with the findings of the empirical literature are difficult, 
as empirical studies have generally focused on how macroeconomic shocks affect the volatility 
of variables measuring asset prices and unemployment. We can consider our framework, 
however, with respect to the empirical evidence of a negative correlation between asset bubbles 
and unemployment. A crucial point of our model is that, in contrast to the existing literature, 
we endogenously consider economic growth. In particular, our framework introduces a capital 
externality that enables an investigation of the role of labour market frictions in the 
determination of economic growth and asset prices. Changes in asset prices are captured by a 
shift in the economy from a non-bubble to a bubble equilibrium. Thus, our framework 
demonstrates a positive relationship between asset bubbles and economic growth that is 
consistent with empirical evidence (Martin and Ventura, 2012; Farmer and Schelnast, 2013). 
3.5.2. A boom and bust pattern of a bubble 
As pointed out by Aliber and Kindleberger (2015), the term “bubble” itself foreshadows the 
end of an economic bubble. Following the discussion of the boom and bust properties of 
bubbles in Farhi and Tirole (2012), there are two types of causes leading to the end of an asset 
bubble. The first type is associated with changes in fundamental variables.22 The second type 
is the realization of a sunspot (extrinsic uncertainty). 
 Because incorporating the second type of cause (the stochastic probability of a bubble 
bursting) into a continuous time model is difficult, it is not treated. In our framework, we show 
that labour market frictions can lead to a bubbly steady state (i.e., a bubble regime). Therefore, 
our framework focuses on the burst of asset bubbles caused by changes in fundamental 
variables, such as labour market conditions, productivity, and government policy. We examine 
the boom and bust of bubbles through regime shifts resulting from changes in parameter 
conditions. In our model, policy and parameter changes (Propositions 2 and 3) may shift the 
economy from a bubble regime to a non-bubble regime (Proposition 4), leading to a bubble 
burst that is accompanied by an increase in the unemployment rate and decreases in the interest 
rate and economic growth rate. Figure 5 summarizes these correlations. 
                                                   
22  Brunnermeier and Oehmke (2015) point out that an initial boom in asset prices 
(potentially an asset price bubble) is often triggered by fundamentals.  
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3.6. Conclusion 
In this paper, we present a continuous-time overlapping-generation model with labour market 
frictions and consider the conditions required for the existence of asset bubbles. We 
demonstrate the theoretical relationships between unemployment, bubbles, and economic 
growth. In contrast to previous studies that only account for the production technology in 
calculations of the interest rate, our framework introduces labour market frictions into an 
endogenous growth model, thereby linking the interest rate with labour market conditions. This 
link, in turn, determines the efficiency of labour in production. Allowing for unemployment, 
economic fluctuations induced by labour market shocks determine whether the economy 
exhibits bubbles or not. In particular, we find that bubbles are more likely to arise when the 
unemployment rate is relatively low and the interest rate is relatively high. Furthermore, we 
show that economic growth is deeply contingent upon the employment situation, as labour 
market efficiency affects capital accumulation through the marginal product of capital.  
 Based on our findings that bubbles may (not) occur when the unemployment rate is low 
(high) and the interest rate and economic growth rate are high (low), it is reasonable to conclude 
that policies that positively influence the labour market (e.g., a reduction in unemployment 
benefits) could improve employment and while creating an asset bubble, raising the interest 
rate and accelerating economic growth. 
 Given these preliminary results, an interesting extension of our framework might be an 
analysis of stochastic bubbles which have an exogenous probability of collapsing. For example, 
Tanaka (2007) introduces the confidence of asset bubble in a two-period overlapping-
generation model and investigates the relationship between the confidence and economic 
growth. A simplified version of the model presented in this paper might allow a stochastic 
probability of the bubble burst in an endogenous growth model with labour market frictions. 
We leave this point as a topic for future work. 
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Appendix 
A1. Derivation of the flow budget constraint (3) 
Bubble asset holdings are defined in nominal terms as b(s, t). Then, the flow budget constraint 
of generation s at time t is  
  [db(s, t)/dt]/p + dk(s, t)/dt = rk(s, t) + w(1 - u) + lwu + vI - t - c(s, t).  
Because the real value of a bubble asset is given by m(s, t) = b(s, t)/p, dm(s, t)/dt = [db(s, t)/dt]/p 
+ rm(s, t) is obtained using the arbitrage condition -( p! /p) = r. Substituting this into the above 
equation yields 
 dm(s, t)/dt - rm(s, t) + dk(s, t)/dt = rk(s, t) + w(1 - u) + lwu + vI - t - c(s, t).  
Therefore, using z(s, t) = k(s, t) + m(s, t) gives the flow budget constraint (3). 
A2. Derivations of (6), (7), and (11) 
Aggregating the flow budget constraint gives 
 Z! = rZ + w(1 - u)N + lwuN + vIN - tN - C.  
Given firm symmetry, we combine the budget constraint of government (5) and the income 
from vacancies, vI = gwv, to obtain 
 Z! = rZ + [w(1 - u) + gwv + µM/N]N - C,  
which is equivalent to (6).  
 The real value of useless assets is given by M = B/p. Using the government policy condition
BB /! = µ and the arbitrage condition -( p! /p) = r, we obtain the following dynamic equation 
for M:  
 rppBBMM +µ=-= /// !!! ,  
which is equivalent to (7).  
 Aggregating the consumption function (10) yields 
 ][ HZC +r= . (A.1) 
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Then, using (9), (A.1), and z(0, 0) = 0, and differentiating the aggregate consumption with 
respect to time, we have 
 ZnCnrnHCrC r-+r-=r+r-= )()(! ,  
which is equivalent to (11). 
A3. Derivation of the equilibrium condition for the goods market (8) 
The following equation is obtained from (6), (7), Z = K + M and vI = gwv:  
 [ ] CNwvuwrKK -g+-+= )1(! . (A.2) 
 With perfect competition in the market for production factors, firms earn zero profits. 
Using this information in conjunction with (14) yields 
 [ ]NwvuwrKY g+-+= )1( , (A.3) 
which implies that total output is distributed as capital income, wage income, and vacancy 
income. Substituting (A.2) into (A.3) yields the equilibrium condition for the goods market (8).  
A4. The explicit expression of G(r) 
Using (27), the quadratic equation for the growth rate (g) can be solved for the two following 
solutions: ( ) ( ) ( ) 2//)(4// 2 úû
ù
êë
é r-ar-+-a+r-+±a+r-+= nrnrrnrrnrg . Because 
g < r/a is required, however, in order for c to take a positive value from (22), only one 
solution may be used: 
 ( ) ( ) ( )úû
ù
êë
é r-a+r--a++r--a++r-ºG= nrnrrnrrnrrg /)(4//
2
1)( 2 ,  
where ( ) ( ) 02/4)0( 2 <úû
ù
êë
é r+r--r-ºG nnn . 
A5. Derivation of the partial derivatives of FL and FR 
Differentiating FL and FR with respect to β, λ, γ, δ, A, and n yields 
 0)1( 2 <gb
l-
-=
b¶
F¶ qL , 
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Figure 1. The threshold between a non-bubble regime and a bubble regime 
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Figure 2 (b). Steady-state unemployment under a bubble regime ( uu < ) 
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4. Asset bubbles, labor market frictions, and R&D-based growth 
4.1. Introduction 
As mentioned by Aliber and Kindleberger (2015), economic bubbles have occurred throughout 
history, often with major impacts on the economies of the countries concerned. Examples 
include the current recession in the United States and other countries, the Japanese experience 
in the late 1980s and 1990s and the 1929 crash. These bubbles featured spectacular booms that 
lasted for a few years followed by dramatic crashes. In 1990 stock prices collapsed, and Japan’s 
deepest and longest depression began and the average growth rate for the decade was 1.7 
percent, and the year 1998 recorded a minus growth. Unemployment rose from 2.1% in 1990 
to 4.7 % in 1999 (Kaihara, 2008). In this way, bubbles have been frequently observed when 
economic activity is booming and the growth rate of GDP is high (Martin and Ventura, 2012; 
Farmer and Schelnast, 2013). Also, empirical studies show that asset bubbles are accompanied 
by a reduction in the unemployment rate (Phelps, 1999; Fitoussi et al., 2000).  
 In this paper, we analyze the interaction between bubbles, unemployment and the long-
run growth rate of the economy. Because technological progress via R&D innovation has been 
identified as the primary driving force of modern economic growth (e.g., Romer 1990), we are 
particularly interested in the effects of these interactions and transitional dynamics on R&D-
based innovations. 
 In the literature of asset bubbles and economic growth, Grossman and Yanagawa (1993), 
King and Ferguson (1993), and Futagami and Shibata (2000) examine the conditions that are 
necessary for bubbles to exist in an overlapping generations economy. In their studies, when a 
bubble arises in the economy, it diverts savings from capital accumulation and retards 
economic growth. For an alternative approach that focuses on the financial market 
imperfections, Hirano and Yanagawa (2010), Martin and Ventura (2012) and Kunieda and 
Shibata (2016) show that asset bubbles can be growth enhancing or growth impairing 
depending on the restrictiveness of the collateral constraint.23 However, these do not consider 
the possibility of unemployment. 
                                                   
23 Most of these studies are based on a model that considers the accumulation of physical 
capital, technological progress via learning by doing, or knowledge spillovers that occur during 
production as fundamental drivers of growth. Consequently, these studies are unable to analyze 
the effects of bubbles on R&D-based innovations, which play a crucial role in modern 
technological development. 
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 There are theories that state that equilibrium unemployment occurs as a result of friction 
in the labor market. In the economy with labor market frictions, the wage rate is endogenously 
determined by agents’ negotiation. Bean and Pissarides (1993) introduces labor market search 
frictions in a standard overlapping generation model, where the wage is negotiated by vacant 
firm and worker,24 and analyze the relationship between economic growth and unemployment. 
Corneo and Marquardt (2000) consider a monopolistic trade union in an endogenous growth 
model, where wages and employment rate are set by the unions.25 To the best of our knowledge, 
however, no studies have used an endogenous growth model to analyze the connection between 
asset bubbles and unemployment.  
 In order to fill this void, we develop an endogenous growth framework with which to 
examine the conditions for bubbles to exist in the economy with labor market frictions. A study 
close to ours is Hashimoto and Im (2016), who use a continuous-time overlapping generations 
model (Weil, 1989) and consider the relationship between bubbles and unemployment in an 
endogenous growth framework (AK model) through a learning-by-doing technological capital 
externality. However, they give the ad-hoc setting in the determination of wage rates and the 
analysis focuses on steady state only. In contrast to it, this paper follows the standard labor 
market frictions where wage rate is endogenously determined by Nash-bargaining negotiation 
between a vacant firm and a worker. In this framework we construct a simple overlapping-
generations model of R&D-based growth with labor market frictions and explore the steady 
state and transitional dynamics of bubbles, economic growth, and employment.26  
 In our model, where unemployment stems from labor market friction, labor market 
efficiency is reflected in the interest rate. Then, because asset returns are related to the interest 
rate, the existence of bubbles depends on conditions in the labor market. As such, we find that 
the equilibrium employment rate is a key factor in the existence of bubbles; when it is over a 
certain level and interest rate is high, bubbles asset can exist. When the conditions are satisfied 
                                                   
24 See Pissarides (2000) for an introduction to search friction models. 
25 See Aghion and Howitt (1994), Eriksson (1997), Caballero and Hammour (1996), and 
Haruyama and Leith (2010) for other models of the relationship between growth and 
unemployment that address labor market frictions. 
26 Miao et al. (2016) and Kocherlakota (2011) present studies that are similar to our own. 
Miao et al. (2016) investigate the relationship between unemployment and stock market 
bubbles in an economy with labor market friction and financial market friction. Kocherlakota 
(2011) assumes that output is determined by household demand, and as such, he does not 
consider the firm’s behavior and capital stock accumulation in an economy with matching 
frictions and bubbles. However, these studies do not consider economic growth endogenously. 
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for bubbles to exist, we say that the economy is in a “bubble regime”; conversely, when it is 
not possible for them to exist, we say that the economy in a “non-bubble regime.” In a bubble 
regime, there are multiple equilibria, such that a steady state can exist either with bubbles or 
without. We show that bubbles divert savings away from the resource of R&D sector and lower 
the output growth rate, which is a common finding in the literature. On the other hand, when 
we compare bubble regimes to non-bubble regimes, we find that the output growth rate is 
always higher under the former than the latter. 
 With our model we can examine the effects of labor market policy or parameter changes 
on bubbles, economic growth, and employment. For example, we find that, because a rise in 
search cost decreases the number of firms with vacant position, it has a negative impact on 
employment (which is a standard conclusion among models with search friction). Thus, if 
search costs are increased in the economy with bubbles, then the employment rate should 
decrease and the labor market should become more inefficient, which would lower the interest 
rate and consequently shift the economy from a bubble regime to a non-bubble regime. As a 
result, employment rate and economic growth fall down associated with bubble bursting. In 
this case, there would be a positive relationship between employment and economic growth.27  
 The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 outlines the features of the 
model. Section 3 discusses the labor market structure. Section 4 describes the traditional 
dynamics and the steady-state equilibrium with and without bubbles, and compares the effects 
of policy and parameter changes under the two regimes on bubbles, economic growth, and 
employment. The final section summarizes our findings and concludes the paper. 
4.2. The model 
This section develops an overlapping generations model with labor market frictions.  A new 
generation is born in each period t = 0, 1, ××× and lives for three periods: young, adult, and old 
age. Each generation has constant population size (L). The economy consists of three sectors: 
a final goods sector, an intermediate goods sector, and an R&D sector. Labor market is opened 
in a final goods sector only. In accordance with Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991) and Barro and 
Sala-i-Martin (2004, Chapter 6), we regard final goods as the production factor in both an 
intermediate goods sector and an R&D sector. R&D firms invent blueprints of intermediate 
                                                   
27 In fact, many empirical studies show a positive relationship between employment rate 
and economic growth (Ball and Moffitt, 2001; Muscatelli and Tirelli, 2001; Staiger et al., 2001; 
Tripier, 2006; Pissarides and Vallanti, 2007). 
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goods and conduct the market launches of these goods. Each intermediate good is produced by 
a single monopoly firm by contrast. Each final good is produced by competitive firms which 
are successful in matching with labor, with a variety of imperfectly substitutable intermediate 
goods as inputs. 
4.2.1. Final goods sector 
In the final goods sector, many identical firms produce unique final goods with the same 
production technology. A firm needs one worker and intermediate goods to produce final goods. 
In the labor market, there are young households and firms with vacant position to find each 
other. When firm is success in matching with one worker, then it operates final good production 
with inputs of intermediate goods. 
 Consider the behavior of the operating production firm. Firm i produces final goods tiy ,
at time t with a following production technology: 
 ( ) djjxy tN titi
a
ò= 0 ,, )( ,   0 < a < 1,  (1) 
where xi,t(j) and Nt the input of intermediate goods for product variety j and the number of 
varieties available at period t, respectively. Then, the operating profits, which is the remainder 
of output to be allotted between firm i and its worker, is given by 
 ò-ºp
tN
titti
Y
ti djjxjpy 0 ,,, )()( ,  (2) 
where pt(j) represents the price of intermediate good j. Because the factors market is 
competitive, from the profit maximization problem, we can get the firm i¢s demand function 
for intermediate goods as: 
 
a-
÷÷
ø
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jxjx
t
tti .  (3) 
The firm-specific index in the final goods sector can be dropped because of the symmetricity 
in production technology; tti yy =, and
Y
t
Y
ti p=p , . 
4.2.2. Intermediate goods sector 
Each intermediate good j is produced by monopolistically competitive firms that hold a 
blueprint for the intermediate good j. One unit of final goods is required to produce one unit of 
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an intermediate good, and the operating profit of each intermediate goods producer )( jXtp  is 
expressed as follows: ( ) )(1)()( jXjpj ttXt -=p  where )( jX t represents the supply of 
intermediate good j. Under monopolistic competition, each firm maximizes its profits given a 
demand curve for its brand. Because final good firms need one worker to produce, the number 
of active firms producing final goods in time t equals to the total number of workers Lts , where 
ts represents employment rate. Then, the aggregate demand for product variety j is defined as
LjxdijxjX tt
L
tit
t
s=º ò
s
)()()(
0 ,
. By using this definition and equation (3), we can obtain the 
demand curve for intermediate good j: 
 L
jp
jX t
t
t s÷÷
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ö
çç
è
æ a
=
a-1
1
)(
)( .  (4) 
 Then, the optimization problem for intermediate good firm j establishes a price that is 
equal to a constant markup over unit cost: 
 
a
==
1)( tt pjp .  (5) 
Thus, the firm-specific index in the intermediate goods sector can be dropped, and profits may 
therefore be expressed as follows:  
 Lt
X
t saa-=p a-
a+
1
1
)1( . (6) 
4.2.3. R&D sector 
The development of R&D technology requires final goods as its input. Denoting h units of the 
final goods between periods t and t + 1, competitive R&D firms can invent one unit of 
tt NN -+1  new blueprints, and sell these blueprints to intermediate goods firms at their market 
values of Dt. Thus, output is expressed as follows: 
 Rttt INN h
=-+
1
1 ,  (7) 
where RtI represents R&D inputs. Under the assumption of free entry in the R&D sector, the 
expected gain of h/Rtt ID from R&D must not exceed the cost of
R
tI for a finite size of R&D 
activities at equilibrium. We assume that the R&D cost is given by Lh=h , which expresses 
57 
 
the dilution effect that removes scale effect as in Laincz and Peretto (2006) and Peretto and 
Connolly (2007). Thus, we have the following conditions: 
 LDt h= .  (8) 
 We next consider no-arbitrage conditions. The market value of intermediate goods firms 
Dt (i.e., the market value of blueprints) is related to the risk-free interest rate rt. Shareholders 
of intermediate goods firms that purchased these shares during period t obtain dividends of 
X
t 1+p  during period t + 1 and can sell these shares to the subsequent generation at a value of 
1+tD . In the financial market, the total returns from holding the stock of a particular 
intermediate firm must be equal to the returns on the risk-free asset tt Dr )1( 1++ , which implies 
the following no-arbitrage condition: for all t, the return on one unit of the stock must be equal 
to the interest rate: 
 
t
t
X
t
t D
Dr 1111 +++
+p
=+ . (9) 
Then, substituting (6) and (8) into (9) gives the interest rate as follows:  
 )( 11 ++ s= tt rr ;  11
1
1
1 )1(
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+ saa-h
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ºs t
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t D
r .  (10) 
4.2.4. Agents 
The first, second and third periods of agents’ lifetime are referred to as young, adult, and old, 
respectively. The cohort born in period t­1 become active workers in period t. Thus, we call 
this cohort generation t. Note that the superscript i denotes an agent’s employment status: i = 
e if employed and i = u if unemployed, which is an outcome of job search. An individual 
derives utility from consumption in old age i+1tc , then the life time utility of individuals in 
generation t is expressed as i+
i = 1tt cU . 
 During the first period, individuals are endowed with one unit of labor. If match with a 
firm is successful in the first period (young), the agent can work and receives wage income tw  
in the second period of their lives (adult). Otherwise the adult receives the unemployment 
benefit from the government zt. Individuals transfer lump-sum tax tt to the government and 
save the after-tax income. The allocation of saving is devoted to the interest-bearing asset and 
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bubbly assets. Following Tirole (1985), we consider bubbly assets. Bubbles are intrinsically 
useless, that is, the fundamental value of the bubbles is zero. The adult will buy bubble only if 
he will be able to resell it at a positive price to the next generation. In the third period, they are 
retired and spend their savings on old-age consumption. Thus, the budget constraint for 
generation t is expressed as follows:  
 ttt
B
tt mps t-w=+
iii ,  t
e
t w=w for employed, t
u
t z=w for unemployed, 
 i+
i
+
i
+ ++= t
B
tttt mpsrc 111 )1( , 
where its  is the interest-bearing asset holdings, 
i
tm  is the demand for bubble assets, 
B
tp is 
the price of bubble asset at time t in real terms of goods. In order to hold bubbles in equilibrium, 
the price of bubbles must satisfy the arbitrage condition 11 1/ ++ += t
B
t
B
t rpp , that is, return of 
bubbles equals the interest rate. Then, an agent’s lifetime utility is given by 
 ))(1( 1 tttt rU t-w+=
i
+
i . (11) 
4.2.5. Government 
Government finances the unemployment benefit using lump-sum tax on households. From the 
condition of a balanced government budget, we have 
 LzL ttt )1( s-=t .  
The left-hand side denotes aggregate tax revenue and the right-hand side represents the 
payment for unemployment benefit. The unemployment benefits are paid to unemployed 
workers following such a policy that tt wzz = , where )1,0[Îz . In other words, the benefit 
payment to each unemployment worker is proportional to but less than the wage rate in the 
current period. 
4.3 Labor market 
4.3.1. Matching mechanism 
As discussed in the previous section, young agents and employers search for each other in the 
labor market. The matching mechanism follows from the standard model of unemployment. 
Because young agents and firms face matching frictions in the current economy, 
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unemployment occurs in equilibrium although each agent is born endowed with one unit of 
labor supplied inelastically. 
 Now, consider matching mechanism in this economy. By denoting the number of 
successful matches as F, this process can be given by matching function F(L, u t-1), where L 
and ut-1 represent the number of young agents and the number of firms with vacancy, 
respectively. Following the standard assumptions, the matching function is to be concave, 
homogeneous of degree one, increasing in both of its arguments, and 0 £ F(L, ut-1) £ min[L, 
ut-1]. The tightness of the labor market is expressed by Ltt /11 -- uºq , then the probability that 
a firm with vacancy matches with a young agent is given by
( ) )(1,/1/),( 1111 ---- qºq=uu tttt qFLF . Note that the probability )(qq holds the following 
properties; q(q)Î[0, 1], 0)( <q¢q , limq®0q(q) = 1 and limq®¥q(q) = 0.28 
 If the search is successful in time t-1, employment is realized in the next period (time t). 
Using the definition of employment rate st, because the realized number of employment is 
equal to the number of successful of matches, it follows that LLF tt s=u - ),( 1 , which is 
rewritten as: 
 )( 11 -- qq=s ttt q , (12) 
It shows that the relationship between the employment rate and the tightness of the labor market, 
from which we obtain 0/ 1 >qs -tt dd  because ( ) 0/,1/)]([ 11111 >q¶q¶=q¶qq¶ ----- ttttt Fq .29 
Therefore, (12) provides a positive relationship between the employment rate and the tightness 
of the labor market, which is so-called Beveridge curve. Thus, when the labor market tightness 
q approaches to zero (infinity), employment rate s becomes zero (unity). 
 If match is made successfully, the firm can produce the final goods and earn operating 
profits. The probability that a firm will be matched with a worker in periods t is given by )( 1-qtq . 
Thus, )(1 1-q- tq is the probability that a firm with vacancy cannot match to a worker. Let Vt 
and Jt be the value of a vacant job and an occupied job in period t, respectively. Then, the value 
of a vacant job is as follows:  
                                                   
28 See den Haan et al. (2000) and Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) for a discussion on 
matching functions. 
29 Using Ltt /11 -- uºq  and (12), it finds that the number of final goods production firms in 
time t are successful in matching in time t - 1; Lq ttt s=qu -- )( 11 . 
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 [ ]tttt
t
tt VqJqr
kV ))(1()(
1
1
1111 ---- q-+q+
+-= , (13) 
where kt-1 denotes the search cost.30 The second term of the right hand side represents the 
expected current value of a successful and an unsuccessful match. The value of an occupied 
job is given by, 
 t
Y
tt wJ -p= .  (14) 
Since the period of employment is one period (adult age), the value of an occupied job is one 
period profit (implying the full separation rate in one period).  
 We assume that the final product firms enter the market freely. Then, from free entry 
condition, the value of a vacant job is Vt = 0 for all t. Consequently, from (13), the value of an 
occupied job becomes )(/)1( 11 -- q+= tttt qkrJ , and substituting it into (14) yields: 
 
)(
)1(
1
1
-
-
q
+
=-p
t
tt
t
Y
t q
kr
w . (15) 
4.3.2. Nash bargaining 
The remainder of output after payments to intermediate goods is allotted to a firm and tis 
worker. We assume that the wage rate is negotiated and determined by Nash bargaining. The 
household surplus and the firm surplus are given by et
e
t UU -  and tt VJ - , respectively. Using 
(11) and (14) with free entry condition Vt = 0, the shares to each are determined by maximizing 
the following Nash product with respect to the wage: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) b-b+b-b -p-+=--= 111 ))(1(maxargmaxarg tYttttttutett wzwrVJUUw , 
where bÎ(0,1) denotes the worker's bargaining power. Then, the wage rate is given by; 
 Yttt zw bp+b-= )1( . (16) 
 Using (1), (2), (3) and (5), the output and operating profit of final goods are given by 
 tt Ny a-
a
a= 1
2
,   t
Y
t Na-
a
aa-=p 1
2
)1( .   (17) 
                                                   
30 The search cost would cover the recruitment activities such as job interviews and the 
evaluation of reference letters, which are done by using the firm’s operating resources. 
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Then, using (17) and the unemployment benefit policy tt wzz = , the wage rate is given by the 
following equation: 
 tt Nzw a-
a
aa-bW= 1
2
)1)(,( , (18) 
where ))1(1/(),( zz b--bºbW Î (0, 1) represents the worker’s output share of Ytp . Then the 
following conditions hold; 0/ >¶W¶ z and 0/ >b¶W¶ . It means that the larger outside 
option that the worker faces leads to the greater share of Ytp , and the larger Nash bargaining 
power enables the worker to obtain the greater share of Ytp .  
 Furthermore, in accordance with Mortensen and Pissarides (1999), Pissarides and Vallanti 
(2007), and Miyamoto and Takahashi (2011), we assume the form of search cost is as follows: 
tt ykk = , that is, the search cost is proportionate to the scale of production, )1,0(Îk .
31 Then, 
substituting tt ykk = , (17), and (18) into (15) yields: 
 
)()1(
)1(
)),(1)(1(
11 -- q+
+
=bW-a-
tt
t
qg
kr
z ,  (19) 
where 111 /)( --- -º tttt NNNg is growth rate of the variety. Eq. (19) is referred as the job 
creation condition (Pissarides, 2000). It shows that at higher ),( bW z  or k , 1-q t  is lower. 
Also, the growth rate on the firm’s effective rate of discount, )1/()1( 1 tt rg ++ - has positive 
effect on a job creation (higher 1-q t ), which is so-called “capitalization effect” (Aghion and 
Howitt, 1994). The following section examines the equilibrium growth rate and employment 
rate. 
4.4. Equilibrium 
4.4.1. The equilibrium dynamics 
Consider the equilibrium dynamics of the economy. First, we derive growth rate of the 
production variety. The final goods market equilibrium condition is given by 
 tt
R
ttttt kIXNCY u+++= ,  (20) 
                                                   
31 This assumption is required to ensure a balanced growth path in which the search cost 
follows the pace of economic growth. 
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where Yt and Ct are the aggregate final goods, and the aggregate consumption, respectively; 
LyY ttt sº  and LcLcC tuttett )1( 11 -- s-+sº . We can obtain the following asset market 
equilibrium condition (the derivation is provided in Appendix A): 
 ttttt kNDS u+= +1 . (21) 
It finds that the interesting-bearing assets consist of the patent of varieties DtNt+1 and the total 
search cost of the matching process for the final goods production utkt.32 On the other hand, 
from the budget constraint of households, the aggregate holdings of the interesting-bearing 
assets ( )LsLsS tuttett )1( s-+sº can be given by: 
 tttt BLwS -s= ,  (22) 
where [ ]LmLmpB tuttetBtt )1( s-+sº represents aggregate demand of asset bubbles. Then, 
denoting the growth rate of varieties as gt º (Nt+1 - Nt)/Nt, we obtain the following equation 
(the derivation is provided in Appendix B): 
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where ttt LNBb /º is defined as the normalized bubbles. It finds that the growth rate depends 
on variables of employment rate and bubbles; ),,( 1 tttt bgg ss= + . 
 Then, using (10), (19) and (23) with )( 1+sq=q tt  from (12), we obtain the dynamics of 
the employment rate: 
 ),(1 ttt bss=s +  Û  ))((
1
),,(1
)(1
1
1
1
+
+
+ sq
D
=
ss+
s+
t
ttt
t q
bg
r ,  (24) 
                                                   
32 Using (9), the holding of the patent of varieties can be rewritten as the current value of 
the return: 1
1
11
1 1 ++
++
+ +
+p
= t
t
t
X
t
tt Nr
D
ND . Also, using (12) and (15) with Ltt /uºq , the total 
search cost can be rewritten as the current value of the return: L
r
w
k t
t
t
Y
t
tt 1
1
11
1 ++
++ s
+
-p
=u . 
Therefore, it finds that the interest-bearing asset is devoted to the investments to the expected 
profits of final goods sector and intermediate goods sector. 
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where )),(1)(1/( zk bW-a-ºD can be interpreted as the cost parameter of firm’s entry because 
the parameterD increases in both search cost k and worker’s profit share ),( zbW . Using (12), 
the probability q is described as a function of s; q¢(s) < 0, q(0) = 1 and q(1) = 0. Then, we 
obtain the following properties; 0/1 >s¶s¶ + tt  and 0/1 <¶s¶ + tt b  (the derivation is 
provided in Appendix C).  
 Let MpB Btt =  be the real value of the bubble at time t, where M is total nominal supply 
of bubbles; then the equilibrium condition is given by LmLmM t
u
tt
e
t )1( s-+s= . By the 
arbitrage condition, we have the dynamics of bubbles: ttt BrB )1( 11 ++ += . Using 
t
B
tt LNMpb /º , then the dynamics of the normalized bubbles can be obtained as follows:  
 ),(1 ttt bbb s=+  Û  t
ttt
t
t bbg
r
b
),,(1
)(1
1
1
1 ss+
s+
=
+
+
+ . (25) 
using (24). The equilibrium of this economy is completely described by these equations; (24) 
and (25) in st and bt. 
 The phase diagram can be drawn on the (st, bt) plane. We refer to the locus on the plane 
(st, bt) representing tt s=s +1 as the s locus and that representing tt bb =+1 as the b locus. 
Using (23), from (24) and (25), the s and b loci are represented as equal parts of (26) and (27), 
respectively; 
tt s³s +1 : ú
û
ù
ê
ë
é
÷
ø
ö
ç
è
æ s
a
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+s+
s
D
-s
a
W
hºsG£ )(1)(1
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)()( tt
t
ttt rrq
rb ,   (26) 
 tt bb ³+1 :  ú
û
ù
ê
ë
é
÷
ø
ö
ç
è
æ s
a
W-
+s+-s
a
W
h³ÛsF³ ++ )(
1)(1)()( 11 tttttt rrrbb ,   (27) 
0=tb .     
where ),(1 ttt bss=s + from (24). The phase diagram is as shown in Figure 1. It shows that the 
slope of the s locus represents the inversed-U shape, in which G(0) < 0, G(1) < 0 and G²(st) < 
0 are satisfied. The b locus has two lines; one is represented by horizontal line in b = 0, and the 
another is represented by an increase curve F¢(st) > 0 in b > 0.33 Then, we can show that there 
are two phases; “non-bubble regime” and “bubble regime” as shown in Figure 1 (i) and (ii), 
                                                   
33 See Appendix D for the slope of s locus and b locus. 
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respectively. In “non-bubble regime”, there is a unique saddle path to the point ENB, since the 
path to point E is source. In this regime, bubbles can not occur. In “bubble regime”, there are 
two equilibrium; EN and EB, since the path to point E is source. The equilibrium path to EN is 
sink, while the equilibrium path to EB is saddle-point stable. 34  In this regime, bubble 
equilibrium can occur at the point EB. 
4.4.2. The condition for bubbles 
In this section, we derive the condition under which bubbles exist in a steady state. In the 
bubble equilibrium, by using equation (25) with (10), the growth rate with a positive bubble gB 
can be expressed by: 
 saa-
h
ºs= a-
a+
1
1
)1(1)(rg B , (28) 
then the growth rate depends only on interest rate. By substituting (28), (12) and (19) into (23) 
and then rearranging them, we can get the value of equilibrium bubble 
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sh= 111)(rb . (29) 
We assume the parameter condition 2/)1( a+>W  for the possibility of bubble equilibrium.35 
From (29) with (10), we obtain the condition of the employment rate for a bubble regime, 
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11)1(
ˆ
1
1 .  (30) 
Then, bubble regime where positive bubble can exist (b > 0) holds for s>s ˆ , while non-bubble 
regime where bubble cannot exist value (b = 0) holds for s£s ˆ . Thus, we obtain the following 
proposition. 
 
Proposition 1: If the equilibrium employment rate is over a threshold level sˆ in (27), then 
bubbles can exist in the equilibrium; if not, then bubbles cannot exist. 
                                                   
34 See Appendix E for the local stability analysis of these equilibrium paths in each regime. 
35  This assumption is imposed to allow bubble equilibrium to occur; otherwise, the 
possibility of bubbles is intrinsically avoided. Note that this assumption is the possibility of a 
non-bubble equilibrium is not eliminated. In fact, the following proposition obtains the non-
bubble equilibrium under it. 
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It implies that the equilibrium employment rate plays an important role in the existence of 
bubbles. The following subsection examines the steady state equilibrium of employment rate 
in greater detail. 
4.4.3. Equilibrium employment and growth 
On the non-bubble economy, from (23) with b = 0, the growth rate without bubble gN can be 
rewritten as: 
 
)(1
1
)(
)(1
s+
W-
+
s
a
W
=s+
rr
g N .  (31) 
The relationship between the growth rate without bubble and the growth rate with bubble is 
described in Figure 2. The economy will be in a bubble regime (non-bubble regime) when the 
equilibrium employment rate is higher (lower) than the threshold level. 
 Now we derive the equilibrium employment. In the steady state, (24) gives the level of the 
employment rate with (31) in bubble-less equilibrium, and with (28) in bubble equilibrium. 
 )(1
)(1
)(1
s
D
=
s+
s+ q
g
r
N  for bubble-less equilibrium, (32) 
 )(11 s
D
= q  for bubble equilibrium, (33) 
where )),(1)(1/( zk bW-a-ºD . The relationship between the employment rate with and 
without bubble is described in Figure 3 (a) and (b). These equations (32) and (33) determine 
the equilibrium of employment rate. We summarize the determinants of employment rate in 
the following lemma. 
 
Lemma 1: An increase in the search cost ( k ) decreases employment rate. An Increase in the 
R&D cost ( h ) has negative effect on the employment rate in the bubble-less equilibrium, while 
it has no effect on the employment rate in the bubble equilibrium. Increases in unemployment 
benefit rate ( z ) and the bargaining power of worker (b) decrease the employment rate in the 
bubble equilibrium, while under bubble-less economy they increase employment rate for 
*),( W<bW z  and decrease it for *),( W>bW z . 
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Proof. See Appendix F. 
 
 An increase in k  is captured by down shift of right hand side of (32) and (33), which 
leads to a negative effect on employment rate. This is because an increase in search cost 
decrease the entry of firms with vacant job, which decreases the labor market tightness and 
employment rate falls. An increase in h  shifts the left hand side of (32) downward, then the 
employment rate decreases in bubble-less equilibrium. The effect of R&D cost increases the 
relative interest rate to growth rate, which decreases the expected current value of profit, 
therefore the entry of firms with vacant job decreases and employment rate falls. Since under 
bubble regime the growth rate always equal to the interest rate, the R&D cost has no impact on 
the determinant of employment. Analogous to the case of k , an increase in ),( zbW , which is 
increases by b or z , shifts the right hand side of (32) and (33) downward, then employment 
rate decrease. In addition to the effect, an increase in ),( zbW  has positive effect on the growth 
rate through an increase in household income, which shifts the left hand side of (32) downward, 
therefore it increases employment rate under bubble-less economy. As shown in Appendix F, 
in the low (high) range of ),( zbW , unemployment benefit rate ( z ) and the bargaining power 
of worker (b) has a positive (negative) effect on employment rate, as the positive effect (income 
effect) dominates the negative effect (entry cost effect). 
4.4.4. The dynamics of boom and bust of bubbles 
The economy will be in a non-bubble or bubble regime when the equilibrium employment rate 
is lower or higher, respectively, than the threshold level. As pointed out by Aliber and 
Kindleberger (2015), the term “bubble” itself foreshadows the end of an economic bubble. If 
the cause of bubble bursting stems from the realization of a sunspot, then the bubble 
equilibrium shifts to the non-bubble equilibrium under bubble regime, which leads to higher 
economic growth. Thus, the bubble burst caused by a sunspot results in bringing a crowd-out 
effect, a negative relationship between bubble and growth (Grossman and Yanagawa, 1993). 
In our framework, we follow the approach of the bubbles boom-bust by Brunnermeier and 
Oehmke (2015), who point out that an initial boom in asset bubble is often triggered by 
fundamentals.36 In our model, it shows that labor market frictions can lead to a bubbly steady 
                                                   
36 See Farhi and Tirole (2012) for the discussion of the boom and bust properties of bubbles; 
two types of causes leading the asset bubbles. 
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state (i.e., a bubble regime). Therefore, our framework focuses on the boom-bust of asset 
bubbles caused by changes in fundamental variables, such as labor market conditions or R&D 
production technologies. 
 We can examine the boom and bust of bubbles through regime shifts resulting from 
changes in parameter conditions. If changes in policies or parameters cause a decrease in the 
employment rate (Lemma 1; e.g., a rise in search cost or a fall in R&D technology), the 
economy will shift from a bubble regime to a non-bubble regime. It finds that the equilibrium 
employment EB in Figure 3(b) changes to ENB in Figure 3(a). A bubble burst is accompanied 
by a decrease in employment rate and economic growth rate. Then, as shown in Figure 2, the 
output growth rate is always higher under the bubble regime than under the non-bubble regime, 
even when bubbles occur.  
 Furthermore, using comparative dynamics in response to changes in parameters, we can 
analyze the dynamic properties of the boom and bust of a bubble in the phase diagram. Consider 
a rise in search cost ( k ), which leads to decrease employment rate in steady state. From (26) 
and (27) with (24), s locus shifts downward and b locus shifts upward.37 Therefore, if changes 
in search cost occur under bubble equilibrium, bubbles can suddenly burst and both 
employment rate and growth rate converge to a lower steady state. Conversely, a decrease in 
search cost can lead to a bubble boom and both employment rate and economic growth rate 
converge to a high steady state. The dynamic behavior of a bubble burst is shown in Figure 4 
(a) and bubble boom in Figure 4 (b).  
 On the effect of production technologies, a fall in R&D productivity (an increase in h ) 
has no effect on the employment rate under bubble steady state equilibrium (lemma 1), while 
it decreases the region of bubble regime (an increase in the threshold level sˆ  from 
Proposition 1). Then, from (26) and (27) with (24), both s locus and b locus shift downward. 
38 Therefore, if a negative shock of R&D productivity occur and the threshold level exceeds 
the employment rate under bubble equilibrium, bubbles can suddenly burst and employment 
rate and growth rate converges to a lower steady state under non-bubble equilibrium.  
 These results are formally stated in the following proposition. 
                                                   
37 See Appendix G for the mathematical derivation of these shifts of s locus and b locus; 
0/ <¶G¶ k  and 0/ >¶F¶ k . 
38 See Appendix G for the mathematical derivation of these shifts of s locus and b locus; 
0/ <h¶G¶  and 0/ <h¶F¶ . 
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Proposition 2: If policies or parameters change to cause a decrease (an increase) in the 
employment rate under bubble economy (under non bubble economy), asset bubbles can burst 
(boom) immediately and employment rate converges to a lower (higher) equilibrium which 
leads to a lower (higher) growth rate. 
 
Figure 5 summarizes the dynamic paths of bubbles, employment rate and economic growth 
after bubble bust. 
4.5. Conclusion 
In this paper, we developed an overlapping-generation model with labor market friction and 
examined the conditions for bubbles. We showed theoretical relationships between bubbles, 
economic growth, and employment. In contrast to previous studies, we introduce labor market 
friction into an endogenous growth model, so that the interest rate depends on labor market 
conditions. Allowing for unemployment, fluctuations induced by the labor market determine 
the type of regime that the economy will be under bubble-less or bubble equilibrium. Based on 
our finding that bubbles can (not) occur when the equilibrium employment rate is high (low), 
and the interest and economic growth rates are high (low), we conclude that policies that have 
a positive impact on the labor market (e.g., a decrease in the search cost) can improve 
employment and place the economy under a bubble regime. This, in turn, will raise both the 
interest rate and the economic growth rate. 
 
Appendices 
Appendix A: The derivation of the equation (21) 
From (15) and (1), the output of a firm can be expressed by 
 ttt
t
tt
tt Nxpq
krwy +
q
+
+=
-
-
)(
)1(
1
1 .  (A1) 
Based on equation (A1), and using (12), Ltt /11 -- uºq , LxX ttt sº  and the fact that the 
number of firms in the final goods sector are equal to the number of successful of matches Lts , 
we can obtain the aggregate the output Yt º yt Lts as follows: 
  ttttttttttt NXpkrLwLyY +u++s=sº -- 11)1( . (A2) 
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Therefore, the market-clearing condition (20) for final goods is expressed in the following 
manner: 
 tt
R
tttttttttttt kIXNCNXpkrLw u+++=+u++s -- 11)1( .  (A3) 
Using ( ) ttXt Xp 1-=p , Lh=h , (7), (8) and (9), we obtain the following expression: 
ttttt
B
ttttttttt
B
tt kNNDMpSrNXpkrMpS u+-+++=-+u+++ +--- )()1()1()1( 1111  
 Û  ])[1( 11111 ----+ u--+=u-- ttttttttttt kNDSrkNDS . 
Because initial assets are given by 11011 ---- u+= kNDS , we obtain (18) for any period t > 0. 
Appendix B: The derivation of (23) 
By dividing equation (21) by LNt and substituting equations (8), (18), (22) and tt ykk = into 
(21) yields the growth rate of varieties tttt NNNg /)( 1 -º +  as follows:  
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 From (19) with (12), the following condition can be obtained; 
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After using (B1) and (B2) with (10) to eliminate ktq , we obtain (23) as follows:  
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Appendix C: The property of s(st, bt) 
Using (23), Eq. (24) can be rewritten as: 
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Totally differentiating (C1) leads to:  
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Appendix D: The slope of s locus and b locus 
First consider the slope of s locus. From (26), we have the slope of s locus as follows: 
  ú
û
ù
ê
ë
é
÷
ø
ö
ç
è
æ s
a
W-
+s+
s
Ds¢
+÷
ø
ö
ç
è
æ ¢
a
W-
+¢
s
D
-¢
a
W
h=sG¢=
s
)(1)(1
)(
)(1
)(
)( 2 tt
t
t
t
t
t
t rr
q
qrr
q
r
d
db .  
Furthermore, we obtain the second derivatives as follows: 
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Then, the condition G²(st) < 0 holds as long as the probability q(×) is not too convex. We assume 
the functional form q(×) to satisfy G²(st) < 0. In addition to the above properties, using s locus,
tttt b s=ss + ),(1 , we have 
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Thus, the slope of s locus is positive when 1/1 >s¶s¶ + tt , while the slope is negative when 
)1,0(/1 Îs¶s¶ + tt . 
 Next consider the slope of b locus. Totally differentiating (27) gives; 
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Using (C2), (C3) and the condition 1/)( 1 =Ds +tq in positive bubble equilibrium (bt > 0), each 
coefficient of dbt and dst is given by 
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Therefore, the slope of b locus, )( ttb sF= , is positive; 0)(/ >sF¢=s ttt ddb in bt > 0.  
Appendix E: Dynamic stability 
Totally differentiating (24) and (25) leads to: 
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Then, the Jacobian matrices of this system are as follows: 
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 First, consider the stability of the equilibrium under non bubble regime (b = 0). The 
following conditions are satisfied around the steady state (ENB): 
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Furthermore, around the steady state at the point ENB in Figure 3 (a), we have 
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Denote the trace and determinant of the Jacobian matrices as T and D respectively. In addition, 
the eigenvalues are denoted as lj (j = 1, 2), the characteristic polynomial is expressed as
DT +l-lºlx 2)( . Under non-bubble regime 0)0( >x and 0)1( <x are obtained. As is well 
known (Azariadis, 1993; Chapter 6), the steady state is a saddle if the relations 0)0( >x and 
0)1( <x hold simultaneously. Therefore, the steady state (ENB) under non bubble regime is 
stable and a saddle. 
 Next, consider the equilibrium under bubble regime; bubble-less equilibrium (EN) and 
bubble equilibrium (EB). Around the steady state under the bubble regime with bubble-less 
equilibrium (EN) the following conditions are satisfied: 
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using (E3). Then, 0)0( >x , 0)1( >x  and T < 2 are obtained. Therefore, the steady state (EN) 
under bubble regime is a sink.  
 Around the steady state under the bubble regime with bubble equilibrium (EB) the 
following conditions are satisfied: 
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Therefore, the steady state with bubbles (EB) under bubble regime is stable and a saddle, since 
0)1( >-x and 0)1( <x  hold simultaneously. 
Appendix F: The proof of lemma 1 
Under bubble regime, totally differentiating (33) gives:  
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 Under bubble-less economy, substituting (31) into (32) leads to 
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Totally differentiating (F1) gives:  
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We can easily confirm that X > 0 when W approaches to 0 and X < 0 when W approaches to 
1. Then, there is the threshold value of W = W* to satisfy X = 0, 
 y-y-y=W 2* ,   where 11 ++aºy
r
r .  
Thus, we obtain 
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Appendix G: Comparative dynamics: k  and h  
From (26), we obtain the following conditions:  
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Using (D1), totally differentiating (27) gives; 
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 Totally differentiating (C1) leads to the following conditions: 
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Using (G3) and (G4), then we obtain the sign of (G1) and (G2) as follows: 
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Figure 3 (a): The equilibrium of employment rate under non-bubble regime 
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5. Asset bubbles, Financial Crisis, and Unemployment 
5.1. Introduction 
A bubble on an asset is defined as the deviation of the asset’s market value from its fundamental 
value. Economic history has repeatedly witnessed severe financial crises accompanied by the 
collapse of asset prices in the modern monetary and financial systems. Before a financial crisis, 
asset prices often deviate upward from their fundamental values, and possibly lead to the higher 
output stimulating employment. When asset prices collapse, however, the output suddenly 
declines and the economy goes into a depression with unemployment expansion.39 As such, a 
bubble bursting arguably causes a higher unemployment rate. Despite these historical 
observations regarding the collapse of asset prices and depressions, the impact of a bubble 
bursting on unemployment has not been fully investigated theoretically in macroeconomics 
although there has been a growing concern about the effect that the presence of asset bubbles 
has on economic growth recently. In this paper, we present a tractable overlapping-generations 
model with asset bubbles to demonstrate that a financial crisis triggered by a bubble bursting 
depresses an economy and expands unemployment. 
 In our model, a bubbly asset has a positive market value because selling the asset is a fund-
raising method for those who draw sufficiently high productivity to initiate an investment 
project and purchasing the asset is a sole saving method for those who draw too low 
productivity to initiate a project. Our model is closely related to the model of Martin and 
Ventura (2012) who develop a tool to investigate how the occurrence of asset bubbles promotes 
capital accumulation and the bursting of bubbles causes depressions. As in Martin and 
Ventura’s model, the youth who draw sufficiently high productivity shocks to become investors 
but face borrowing constraints issue the new bubbly assets to raise funds. Once they sell the 
new bubbly assets in the asset market, they do not have to purchase them back from the market. 
Accordingly, the youth have always incentives to issue the new bubbly assets and obtain more 
funds that cannot be acquired otherwise because of borrowing constraints. 
 Although the central role of asset bubbles in our model is similar to that of Martin and 
Ventura (2012), our model departs from theirs in some respects. First, we employ a continuous 
distribution with respect to idiosyncratic productivity shocks, whereas Martin and Ventura 
applies a binary distribution. The use of continuous productivity distribution significantly 
                                                   
39	 Empirical studies such as Phelps (1999) and Fitoussi et al. (2000) provide evidence 
showing that a reduction in unemployment rates is accompanied by the growing asset prices. 
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simplifies the analysis. In particular, one can derive the productivity cutoff that divides agents 
into bubbly-asset holders and investors. Those who draw productivity shocks smaller than the 
cutoff purchase bubbly assets and those who draw productivity shocks greater than the cutoff 
become investors. Our model obtains a simple two-dimensional dynamical system with respect 
to capital and the cutoff, by which one can easily investigate the dynamic behavior of the 
system. It is impossible to analyze such a dynamical system with a binary productivity 
distribution. Second, we introduce labor market frictions. The investigation of the relationship 
between a bubble bursting and unemployment is a main theme in this paper. By introducing 
labor-market matching frictions in our tractable model along the same line as Bean and 
Pissarides (1993), we can demonstrate that a bubble bursting expands unemployment under 
mild parameter conditions, which is a new result in the literature that deals with asset bubbles 
´a la Tirole (1985).40 
 The presence of asset bubbles corrects allocative inefficiency, relocating investment 
resources from low productive agents to high productive agents, and promotes capital 
accumulation if bubbles’ crowding-out effect ´a la Tirole (1985) is relatively weak. As capital 
accumulates and output increases, the number of vacant positions increases because each firm 
acquires more funds to cover a fixed search cost. As a result, an unemployment rate decreases.41 
However, extrinsic uncertainty may burst asset bubbles and cause a self-fulfilling financial 
crisis, which is followed by the expansion of unemployment. The bubbly asset plays a financial 
intermediation role as pointed out by Mitsui and Watanabe (1989). As previously stated, 
however, the bubbly asset that is newly issued in each period is never withdrawn from the 
economy and investors never repay the funds raised by issuing the bubbly asset as in the model 
of Martin and Ventura (2012). This Ponzi game can be played because financial market 
imperfections render the market interest rate less than the economic growth rate in equilibrium 
when the bubbly asset is not present.  
 The literature of asset bubbles and economic growth has been renewably growing 
recently, in which the presence of asset bubbles promotes capital accumulation and economic 
                                                   
40For traditional models that address the relationship between economic growth and 
unemployment with labor market imperfections, see Aghion and Howitt (1994), Eriksson 
(1997), Caballero and Hammour (1996), and Haruyama and Leith (2010). See also Pissarides 
(2000) for the introduction to search friction models. 
41This outcome gets along with many empirical studies that show a negative relationship 
between unemployment and economic growth (Ball and Moffitt, 2001; Muscatelli and Tirelli, 
2001; Staiger et al., 2001; Tripier, 2006; Pissarides and Vallanti, 2007 
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growth.42 In this renewably growing stream of literature, financial market imperfections and 
the productivity differences across agents are key factors in producing such a situation that 
asset bubbles enhance capital accumulation. Farhi and Tirole (2012), Martin and Ventura 
(2012), Carvalho et al. (2012), and Kunieda (2014) create such a situation by applying the 
overlapping generations framework of Samuelson (1958), Tirole (1985), or Blanchard (1985). 
To produce the same situation, Aoki and Nikolov (2015), Hirano et al. (2015), and Kunieda 
and Shibata (2016) develop dynamic general equilibrium models in which asset bubbles occur 
in equilibrium despite the assumption of infinitely lived agents and the presence of bubbles 
promotes economic growth through the mechanism similar to that found first by Mitsui and 
Watanabe (1989). Although all these studies consider asset bubbles ´a la Tirole (1985) and 
obtain the result that the presence of asset bubbles promote capital accumulation as in the 
current model, they do not investigate how unemployment rates are affected by the presence 
of asset bubbles. Miao et al. (2016) investigate the relationship between unemployment and 
stock market bubbles in an economy with labor market and financial market frictions. However, 
their definition of bubbles is totally different from ours: they essentially consider multiple 
equilibria of the fundamental values of an intrinsically useful asset.43 The remainder of this 
paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the model and section 3 investigates the 
dynamic behavior in equilibrium and derives the relationship between the unemployment rate 
and capital accumulation. In section 4, the growth-promoting effect of asset bubbles is analyzed 
and section 5 derives a self-fulfilling financial crisis as a rational expectations equilibrium. 
Section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
5.2. The model 
The economy is represented in discrete time, ranging from time t = 0 to t = ∞, and it consists 
of overlapping generations: young and old agents. Each agent lives for two periods. The 
population of each generation is constant, which is given by L. Only young agents have an 
                                                   
42Researchers in the traditional literature on asset bubbles and economic growth have long 
discussed the growth effects of bubbles by applying the overlapping generations model. See 
Tirole (1985), Weil (1987), Grossman and Yanagawa (1993), King and Ferguson (1993), 
Futagami and Shibata (2000), Kunieda (2008), Mino (2008) and Matsuoka and Shibata (2012), 
among others. Regrettably, their results cannot explain the historical events in which severe 
economic depressions arguably follow the collapse of asset bubbles. 
43Although Kocherlakota (2011) investigate the impact of the occurrence of asset bubbles 
on unemployment, he does not consider capital accumulation 
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opportunity to work, matching with a firm, so L is also the size of total labor force supplied in 
each period. 
 
5.2.1. Final goods sector 
In the final goods sector, many identical firms produce final goods with the same production 
technology. In addition to capital, one worker is necessary for a firm to produce the final goods. 
More concretely, workers and firms with vacant positions search for each other in the labor 
market. Firms that successfully match with a worker can operate their business. Firm i produce 
final goods yi,t at time t with a Cobb-Douglas production technology: aa -= 1,,, tititi lAzy , where	𝛼 ∈ (0,1) is a capital share of output, zi,t is capital, which depreciates in one period, li,t is labor 
employed by firm i, and A is productivity of the technology. Because an operating firm hires 
only one worker eventually it holds that li,t = 1, and the production function is condensed as 
follows: 
 atiti Azy ,, = . (1) 
Because the capital market is competitive, capital is paid its marginal product: 
 1,
-= aa tit Azq , (2) 
where qt is the capital price. Then, the remainder of output to be allocated between firm i and 
its worker is given by 
 aap ttitti Azzqy )1(: ,, -=-= . (3) 
The firm-specific index i is dropped because each firm employs the same amount of capital, 
facing the common capital price. 
 
5.2.2.  Agents 
An agent born at time t exclusively derives her utility from consumption in old age, which is 
denoted by i 1+tc . Note that ι represents an agent’s employment status: ι = e if employed and ι 
= u if unemployed, which is an outcome of job search in youth. Because she does not consume 
in the first period of her lifetime, she turns over all her income in youth to maximize her lifetime 
utility, ii 1+= tt cU . In the first period, she is endowed with one unit of labor. A successful match 
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with a firm enables her to work for the firm and earn a wage income, wt. Otherwise, she receives 
an unemployment benefit, tg , from the government. Because the government imposes a lump-
sum tax, τt, on young agents to cover the unemployment benefit, the agent’s net income in the 
first period is given by tt tw
i - where tt w=
iw  if employed and tt gw
i =  if unemployed. 
 Following Martin and Ventura (2012) and Ikeda and Phan (2015), it is assumed that agents 
can issue new bubbly assets, which is intrinsically useless, to obtain extra funds in the first 
period although they face borrowing constraints. The agent’s total funds available for saving 
are given by 
 Ntttt bs +-= tw
ii : , (4) 
where Ntb  is new bubbly assets issued by the agent at time t.
44 To derive an equilibrium in 
which bubbly assets exist, we limit the ceiling of bubbly assets in amount that each agent can 
issue as follows: 
 )1,0(~ Î£ µµ 　　t
N
t bb , (5) 
where tb
~  is the average amount of bubbly assets per young agent that exist at the end of time 
t.45 More concretely, tb
~  satisfies LbB tt
~
= ,where Bt is the real value of the total bubbly asset 
at time t, which includes the newly issued bubbly asset at time t.46 Agents are willing to raise 
new bubbly assets as many as possible, because once they obtain extra funds by issuing the 
assets, they do not have to repay for them. Therefore, the equality holds in inequality (5) in 
equilibrium. 
 There is no storage technology for the final goods, which are perishable in one period. 
Instead, agents have two saving methods: one is initiating an investment project and the other 
                                                   
44To understand the bubbly assets newly issued by agents but never redeemed, one can 
imagine the securitization of commercial loans. The recent financial innovation securitizes 
commercial loans, and an asset backed by the loans can be purchased and sold in the primary 
and secondary markets. In the process of securitization, asset holders may be unable to identify 
the fundamental value of the asset. In such a case, even though the fundamental value of the 
asset is actually zero, such a worthless asset would be traded in the financial market as far as 
participants in the market believe in the market value of the asset. 
45The assumption regarding the limitation of the new issuance of bubbly assets is also 
imposed in Martin and Ventura (2012) and Ikeda and Phan (2015). In any case, one must 
impose the upper limit of the new issuance of bubbly asset; otherwise, the market for the bubbly 
asset cannot be sustainable. One may consider that the new issuance is regulated institutionally. 
46In section 5.2.5, the formal definition for Bt is provided. 
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is purchasing bubbly assets. Agents that purchase one unit of bubbly assets at time t earn a 
(gross) return, rt+1, at time t + 1, whereas agents that invest one unit of funds in a project at 
time t create Φ units of capital goods and sell them to firms at a price, qt+1, at time t + 1; namely, 
they earn a return, qt+1Φ. Φ is productivity for capital production and varies across agents. 
When an agent is born, she receives an individual-specific shock, Φ. The support of Φ is [0, η] 
where η > 0 and its cumulative distribution function is given by G(Φ), which is time-invariant 
and continuously differentiable on the support. Although Φ is an idiosyncratic shock, the 
realization of low productivity cannot be insured against because there is no insurance market 
for it. Φ is independent of the employment status. Note that when agents invest in a project, the 
shocks are already realized. Knowing their own productivity, they make a portfolio choice 
between investing in a project and purchasing bubbly assets to maximize their lifetime utility. 
As such, the individual-specific return is deterministic when they make a portfolio choice, 
which is given by Rt+1 = max{qt+1Φ, rt+1} and an agent’s lifetime utility is given by 
 ii ttt sRU 1+= . (6) 
Define tf := rt+1/qt+1. Then, a portfolio choice of an agent who draws productivity Φ is given 
by 
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As seen in Eqs. (7) and (8), agents who draw productivity smaller than tf  purchase bubbly 
assets and agents who draw productivity greater than tf  invest in a project.
47 Note that tf  
is a productivity cutoff that divides agents into investors and bubbly asset holders. The 
population of investors is (1 −G( tf ))L and that of bubbly asset holders is G( tf )L. 
                                                   
47In the current model, agents can issue new bubbly assets before the portfolio choice and 
the realization of individual-specific productivity shocks as presented in Eq. (4). For the trade 
timing in such market circumstances, we implicitly assume that a market maker is present in 
the asset market. 
87 
 
5.2.3. Government 
The government runs a balanced budget to provide unemployment benefits for workers such 
that 
 LuL ttt gt = , (9) 
where ut is the unemployment rate. The left-hand side of Eq. (9) denotes the aggregate tax 
revenue and the right-hand side represents the total payments for unemployment benefits. 
 
5.2.4. Labor market 
We introduce labor-market matching frictions in the model along the same line as Bean and 
Pissarides (1993). Although the matching mechanism follows from the standard 
unemployment model (e.g., Diamond, 1982; Mortensen and Pissarides, 1999; Petrongolo and 
Pissarides; 1990), there is no time lag between a match of parties and a start of business 
operation in the current model. 
 
5.2.4.1 Matching mechanism 
Because workers and firms face matching frictions, unemployment occurs in equilibrium 
although each agent is born endowed with one unit of labor that she supplies inelasitically in 
youth. The number of successful matches are given by F(L, υt), which is a function of the 
population of workers, L, and the number of firms with vacancy, υt, where 0 ≤ F(L, υt) ≤ min{L, 
υt} for L∈ [0, ∞) and υt∈ [0, ∞), and F(0, υt) = 0 and F(L, 0) = 0. The matching function F(L, 
υt) is continuously differentiable, concave, homogeneous of degree one, and increasing with 
respect to both L and υt. The tightness of the labor market is expressed by θt := υt/L∈ (0, ∞), 
which is considered as the jobs-to-applicants ratio, and the probability that a firm with vacancy 
matches with a worker is given by F(L, υt)/υt = F(1/θt, 1) =: f(θt). It is assumed that f(θt) is 
continuously differentiable in (0, ∞) where f ¢ (θt) < 0 for θt ∈ (0, ∞), limθt→0 f(θt) = 1, and 
limθt→∞ f(θt) = 0. Because the number of employment is equal to the number of successful 
matches, it follows that (1 −ut)L = F(L, υt), which is rewritten as 
 )(1 ttt fu qq=- . (10) 
Eq. (10) shows the relationship between the unemployment rate and the labor market tightness. 
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Eq. (10) yields the unemployment rate, ut, as a function of θt such that ut = u(θt) where u¢ (θt) 
< 0 because ∂[θtf(θt)]/∂θt = ∂F(1, θt)/∂θt > 0. Therefore, Eq. (10) derives a negative relationship 
between the unemployment rate and the labor-market tightness, which is so-called the 
Beveridge curve. 
 A successful match enables a firm to produces the final goods. Because f(θt) is the 
probability that a firm matches with a worker at time t, the firm’s expected profits, Vt, are given 
by 
 hwfV tttt --= ))(( pq , (11) 
where h is the search cost in the labor market that the firm incurs when searching for a worker.48 
Because the ceiling of f(θt) is 1, if the actual revenue πt – wt less than h, no firms operate because 
the expected profits are negative. In other words, only if πt −wt ≥ h, successful matches occur 
between workers and firms. We proceed our investigation for the case in which πt −wt ≥ h for 
a while unless otherwise stated. The free-entry condition for the final goods sector leads to zero 
profits of each firm. Accordingly, it follows that Vt = 0, or equivalently 
 
)( t
tt f
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q
p =- . (12) 
5.2.4.2  Nash bargaining 
The remainder of output after payments to capital is allotted between the firm and its worker. 
The shares to each are determined by maximizing the following Nash product with respect to 
the wage: 
 bbbb pgp -+
- --=--= 11
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,  
where β∈(0, 1) is the worker’s bargaining power and Rt+1 is the return to saving, which was 
derived in section 5.2.2. From the Nash bargaining solution, it follows that 
 tttw bpgb +-= )1( . (13) 
The government policy regarding unemployment pays the unemployment benefits to 
                                                   
48The search cost would cover the recruitment activities such as job interviews and the 
evaluation of reference letters, which are done by using the firm’s operating resources. One 
can consider that the search cost associated with these activities is an implicit opportunity cost 
that the firm incurs. 
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unemployed workers in such a way that tt wgg = where γ ∈ [0, 1]. We assume that when the 
firm and its worker are bargaining, the Nash product is maximized with tg  given. The 
government eventually performs the policy in such a way that the benefit payment is 
proportional to the wage rate. Inserting Eq. (3) and tt wgg =  in Eq. (13) yields 
 aa tt Azw )1( -W= , (14) 
where Ω := β/{1 − (1 − β)γ} ∈ (0, 1) is the worker’s output share of πt. Note from Ω = β/{1 
− (1 − β)γ} that the larger outside option, γwt, and the larger Nash bargaining power, β, lead to 
the greater worker’s share. Substituting Eq. (3) and (14) in Eq. (12) yields 
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 Thus far, we have investigated the model assuming that there are always operating firms. 
However, it is noted from Eq. (15) that given parameter values, if zt is very small, firms cannot 
cover a search cost, h, because the upper limit of f(θt) is 1. 
Proposition 1 Define z  := [h/{(1 − Ω)(1 − α)A}] a
1
. 
• If zt ≤ z , there are no operating firms in the economy at time t. 
• If zt > z , there are operating firms in the economy at time t. 
Proof: See the Appendix. 
 In the first case of Proposition 1, the economy certainly breaks down at time t because no 
firms produce final goods at that time. In this case, no agents initiate an investment project at 
time t − 1, anticipating the breaking down. Moreover, no young agents at time t can purchase 
the bubbly asset because they do not earn the labor income at that time, and thus, the bubbly 
asset has no value at time t. Anticipating this, no young agents purchase the bubbly asset at 
time t − 1. Accordingly, the backward induction shows that the bubbly asset has no value even 
at time zero. Additionally, young agents at time t − 1 anticipate that they cannot obtain the 
returns from investment projects at time t. Given their anticipations, we can reasonably assume 
that young agents at time t – 1 do not supply their labor force at time t −1 because they do not 
consume in the first period of their lifetime and are not necessarily benevolent. As a result, the 
economy breaks down at time t −1. The backward induction, again, shows that the economy 
breaks down at time zero. In summary, if zt becomes less than z  at a certain point in time, it 
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is highly likely that the economy is unsustainable for all t ≥ 0 without the occurrence of 
production. In what follows, we assume away the first case of Proposition 1 and focus on the 
case in which zt > z  for all t ≥ 0. 
 In the second case of Proposition 1, it follows from Eq. (15) that θt =vt/L > 0, which implies 
that there exist firms with vacancy at time t and the unemployment rate is less than one from 
Eq. (10). 
5.2.5  Bubbly Asset 
The bubbly asset is intrinsically useless. It is assumed that at time 0, there are identical old 
agents who hold the bubbly asset, M−1, in total. Additionally, in each period, the bubbly asset 
is newly issued by young agents. Formally, for t ≥ 0, we have a dynamic equation with respect 
to the nominal bubbly asset as follows: 
 Nttt MMM += -1 , (16) 
where Mt is the total nominal supply of the bubbly asset and NtM is the asset that is newly 
issued by young agents at time t. Multiplying both sides of Eq. (16) by the bubbly asset price, 
pt, and defining the real value of the bubbly asset as Bt = ptMt and NtB  = pt NtM , we obtain the 
dynamic equation of the real value of the bubbly asset as Bt = (pt/pt−1)Bt−1 + NtB , or equivalently 
 Ntttt BBrB += -1 , (17) 
where rt := pt/pt−1, which is the return to holding the bubbly asset. 
 
5.3  Equilibrium 
The equilibrium is characterized by the optimization conditions of the agents and firms, the 
outcomes of the Nash bargaining in the labor market, and the market clearing conditions for 
the bubbly asset and capital. 
 
5.3.1.  Market clearing conditions 
Bt and NtB  are the aggregations of tb
~  and Ntb  over all agents, namely Bt = tb
~ L and NtB = 
N
tb L. Because the equality in inequality (5) holds in equilibrium, it follows that 
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t BB µ= . (18) 
Substituting Eq. (18) in Eq. (17) yields 
 11 --
= t
t
t B
rB
µ
. (19) 
 In each period, the bubbly asset is purchased by less productive agents regardless of their 
employment status. Because the population of less productive agents who drew the productivity 
that is smaller than the cutoff, tf , and purchase the bubbly assets is G( tf )L, the demand for 
the bubbly asset is given by 
 )]())(1[()( Ntttt
N
ttttt
d
t bubwuLGB +-++--= tgtf . (20) 
It follows that Bt = dtB  in equilibrium, and thus, the use of Eqs. (9), (14), and (18) rewrites 
Eq. (20) as follows: 
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From Eqs. (2), (19), (21), and 1-tf = rt/qt, we obtain 
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 Capital at time t is produced by the agents who draw such high productivity that Φ > 1-tf . 
Therefore, the aggregate capital is given by 
 ò
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The number of firms that successfully match with a worker at time t is (1−ut)L, and thus, capital 
per operating firm, zt, is given by zt = Zt/{(1 − ut)L}. The use of Eqs. (4), (7), (9), (14), (18), 
and (21) rewrites Eq. (23) as follows: 
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where H( 1-tf ) := ò
-
FF
h
f 1
)(
t
dG . 
92 
 
5.3.2.  Dynamical system 
From Eqs. (10) and (15), we obtain the following equation: 
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Inserting this equation into Eq. (24) yields the dynamic equation with respect to zt as follows: 
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Eqs. (22) and (24) yield the dynamic equation with respect to the cutoff tf : 
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 Eqs. (26) and (27) can derive an autonomous dynamical system with respect zt and tf . 
Noet that Eq. (27) is solely an autonomous difference equation with respect to tf . Because the 
cutoff, tf , is in [0, η] and because we focus on the case in which zt > z  for all t ≥ 0 as 
discussed in the previous section, the domain of the dynamical system consisting of Eqs. (26) 
and (27) is given by ( z , ∞)×[0, η].  
 We assume that the initial total capital, Z0, already exists at time 0. Then, the initial capital 
per operating firm, z0, the initial labor-market tightness, θ0, and the initial unemployment rate, 
u0, are determined by Eqs. (10), (15), and z0(1 − u0)L = Z0 simultaneously, which means that 
all these three variables are pre-determined at time 0. In contrast, the initial real value of bubbly 
asset, B0, is not pre-determined because its price, p0, can jump depending upon agents’ self-
fulfilling expectations. Accordingly, 0f  is not pre-determined, either, because tf  has a one-
to-one relationship with Bt as seen in Eq. (21), given zt and ut. This means that 0f  is also 
affected by agents’ self-fulfilling expectations. Given {z0, u0, θ0, B0}, the equilibrium sequences,
¥
=0},,,,{ tttttt Buz fq , are produced from Eqs. (10), (15), (21), (26), and (27), where (zt, tf ) ∈ 
( z , ∞) × [0, η] for all t ≥ 0. 
	
5.3.3.  Steady states and stability 
Proposition 2  In the dynamical system consisting of Eqs. (26) and (27), there exist two (non-
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trivial) steady states: (z∗, *f ) and (z∗∗, **f ) such that 
 af -= 1
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 a-= 1
1
** )0(Qz , (30) 
and 
 0** =f , (31) 
where Q(x) = (1 − α)ΩAH(x)/(1 − µG(x)). 
Proof: See the Appendix. 
 Because *f  > 0 and the unemployment rate is always less than one, Eq. (21) implies that 
the bubbly asset has a market value in the steady state given by (z∗, *f ). So, we call this steady 
state a bubbly steady state. In contrast, in the steady state given by (z∗∗, **f ), the bubbly asset 
has no market value and we call this steady state a bubbleless steady state. The linear 
approximation of the dynamical system around a steady state is computed from Eqs. (26) and 
(27) as follows: 
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where ( zˆ ,fˆ )=(z∗,	 *f ) or (z∗∗, **f ). Note that κ1( zˆ ) and κ2(fˆ ) are the eigenvalues of the local 
dynamical system associated with Eq. (32). 
 
Lemma 1  The eigenvalues of the local dynamical system associated with Eq.(32) around the 
bubbly steady state, (z∗, *f ), are given by 
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 The eigenvalues of the local dynamical system associated with Eq. (32) around the 
bubbleless steady state, (z∗∗, **f ), are given by 
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Proof: See the Appendix. 
 
Proposition 3  In the dynamical system consisting of Eqs. (26) and (27), the bubbly steady 
state, (z∗, *f ), is a saddle point and the bubbleless steady state, (z∗∗, **f ), is totally stable. 
 
Proof: See the Appendix. 
 
[Figure 1 around here] 
 
 Figure 1 provides a phase diagram that illustrates the dynamic behavior of the economy. 
Because 0f  can jump and the bubbly steady state is a saddle point, the bubbly steady state is 
locally determinate. However, the bubbleless steady state is totally stable, and thus, any 
sequence of ¥=0},{ tttz f with (z0, 0f ) ∈ ( z , ∞) × (0, 
*f ) that converges to (z∗∗, 0) is an 
equilibrium. This means that equilibrium is globally indeterminate. Because of indeterminacy 
of equilibrium, self-fulfilling financial crises are caused by extrinsic uncertainty as investigated 
in section 5. Note that any sequence of ¥=0},{ tttz f with (z0, 0f ) ∈ ( z , ∞)×(
*f , η] cannot be 
an equilibrium because tf  becomes greater than η or zt becomes less than z  in finite time. 
 
5.3.4  Beveridge curve and capital accumulation 
Eq. (10) can be rewritten as follows: 
 )(1 ttt fu qq-= , (33) 
95 
 
where ∂ut/∂θt < 0. Eq. (33) is the Beveridge curve as stated in section 5.2.4. From Eq. (15), it 
follows that 
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1 , (34) 
which we call the job-creation condition following Pissarides (2000). From Eq.(34), it is 
straightforward to show that ∂θt/∂zt > 0 because f−1(.) is a decreasing function. This means that 
capital accumulation promotes employment, rendering the labor market tighter. As capital 
accumulates, an economy moves down along the Beveridge curve from point A to point B in 
Figure 2 and the unemployment rate decreases. 
 
[Figure 2 around here] 
 
5.4  Capital accumulation, asset bubbles, and unemployment 
The Beveridge curve given by Eq. (33) and the job-creation condition given by Eq. (34) 
demonstrates that capital accumulation decreases the unemployment rate. This means that if 
the presence of asset bubbles promotes capital accumulation, it decreases the unemployment 
rate. In this section, we investigate the effects that asset bubbles have on capital accumulation 
and the unemployment rate. 
 
5.4.1.  Comparison between bubbly and bubbleless steady states 
Because the bubbly steady state is a saddle point and because the initial cutoff, 0f , is non-
predetermined, and initial capital is predetermined, the equilibrium in the neighborhood of the 
bubbly steady state is locally determinate. On the stable saddle path that converges to the 
bubbly steady state, the cutoff is constant, which is given by tf  = 
*f , as illustrated in Figure 
1, and the rational expectations equilibrium in the neighborhood of the bubbly steady state is 
given by the following equations: 
 *ff =t  (35) 
and 
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 By contrast, because the bubbleless steady state is totally stable, the equilibrium in the 
neighborhood of the bubbleless steady state is indeterminate, and there exist an uncountably 
infinite number of equilibrium trajectories around the bubbleless steady state. Under these 
circumstances, for the sake of investigating the growth-promoting effects of asset bubbles, we 
consider a particular rational expectations equilibrium in which agents anticipate no presence 
of asset bubbles for all t ≥ 0, which is given by the following equations: 
 )0(* ==fft  (37) 
and 
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Note from the right-hand sides of Eqs. (36) and (38) that the presence of asset bubbles promotes 
(impedes) capital accumulation if H( *f )/[1 −µG( *f )] is greater (less) than H( **f )/{1 − 
µG( **f )}. To investigate whether H( *f )/[1 −µG( *f )] is greater or less than H( **f )/[1 − 
µG( **f )], consider the following function: 
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which is used in the proof of Proposition 2 (in the Appendix). The first derivative of Λ(f ) is 
given by 
 2)](1/[)()()( fµfff GJG -¢=L¢ , (40) 
where J(f ) = µ(1 − µG(f ))[Λ(f ) − f /µ]. As shown in the proof of Proposition 2, there exists 
f  =f ∈(0, η) such that for f∈[0, f ), we have J(f ) > 0, and for f∈(f , η], we have 
J(f ) < 0. From Eq. (39), it follows that Λ(0) = H(0) > 0, and Λ(η) = 0. Then, the configuration 
of Λ(f ) is obtained as in Figure 3. Note that f is given by the intersection of Λ(f ) with f
/µ. Moreover, *f is given by the intersection of Λ(f ) with Γ(f ) := αf /[(1 − α)(1 − µ)Ω]. 
Figure 3 illustrates Λ(f ) and Γ(f ). Because Λ(f ) is inverted-U shaped, there exist a solution, 
f~ > 0, for Λ(f ) = H(0) as seen in Figure 3. 
97 
 
 
Proposition 4	 	 All parameter values being fixed, if α/[(1 − α)(1 − µ)Ω]> (<) H(0)/f~ , then 
capital more (less) accumulates in the bubbly steady state than in the bubbleless steady state. 
 
Proof. See the Appendix. 
 As can be seen in Figure 3, as the upper limit of the issuance of new bubbly assets is more 
relaxed, i.e., as µ increases, Λ(f ) shifts upward and Γ(f ) rotates counterclockwise. Therefore, 
as the upper limit of the issuance of new bubbly assets is more relaxed, it is more likely that 
capital more accumulates in the bubbly steady state than in the bubbleless steady state. In such 
a case, much issuance of the bubbly asset increases the market interest rate, rt, and thus, 
excludes a larger number of less productive agents from production activities. Accordingly, 
more productive agents intensively use more production resources. As a result, they produces 
the final goods to a larger extent, and thus, capital accumulation is promoted.  
 Remark 1 below immediately follows from Proposition 4 because capital accumulation 
reduces the unemployment rate. 
 
Remark 1  All parameter values being fixed, if α/[(1−α)(1−µ)Ω]> (<) H(0)/ f~ , the 
unemployment rate in the bubbly steady state, u∗, is less (greater) than in the bubbless steady 
state, u∗∗. 
 
All parameter values being constant, if α/[(1−α)(1−µ)Ω]>H(0)/f~ , u∗ is less than u∗∗; however, 
β and γ, which represent the labor market conditions, have non-linear effects on the 
unemployment rate. This is because as Ω increases, capital accumulation is promoted through 
agents savings, whereas the firms’ output share decreases and the decrease in the firms’ output 
share causes a downward pressure on the number of vacant positions with a fixed search cost. 
In the next section, we numerically examine the effects that β and γ have on the unemployment 
rate assuming their plausible values. 
 
[Figure 3 around here] 
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5.4.2.  Numerical analysis 
In this section, we numerically investigate the effects that labor market conditions, such as 
workers’ Nash bargaining power, β, and the unemployment benefit ratio, γ, have on 
macroeconomic variables such as capital accumulation, unemployment rates, and the labor-
market tightness (the jobs-to-applicants ratio) in both bubbly and bubbleless steady states. 
5.4.2.1  Specification and paramerization 
In doing the numerical analysis, the matching function is specified as F(L, υt) = Lυt (Lσ+υtσ)−1/σ, 
following Den Haan et al. (2000). This matching function appropriately satisfies the conditions 
imposed in section 5.2.4. It is assumed that the individual-specific productivity shock, Φ, is 
uniformly distributed in [0, η]. Under these assumptions, each variable can be computed as in 
the following. In the bubbleless steady state, we obtain 
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where u∗∗ and θ∗∗ are respectively the unemployment rate and the labor-market tightness in the 
bubbleless steady state. Likewise, in the bubbly steady state, we obtain  
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where u∗ and θ∗ are respectively the unemployment rate and the labor-market tightness in the 
bubbly steady state, and	 *f  is computed from Eq. (29) as 
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[Table 1 around here] 
 The parameters applied in the analysis are given in Table 1. Following Den Haan et al. 
(2000), we set α = 0.36. We examine the effects of β (workers’ Nash bargaining power) and γ 
(the unemployment benefit ratio) by varying β and γ. If β and/or γ are very close to 1, Ω is also 
close to 1. In this case, the economy becomes infeasible in the sense that production never 
occurs as clarified in Proposition 1 (in section 2) and the discussion that follows the proposition. 
Therefore, we must impose the upper ceiling of β and γ. DenHaan et al. (2000) examine the 
case in which the firm’s Nash bargaining power is 0.50. Additionally, the 45%-80% of the 
average wage for the last six months is paid to the unemployed people in Japan for the 
unemployment benefit. Accordingly, we vary β from 0.40 to 0.60 and fix γ = 0.80 when 
examining the effect of β, and we vary γ from 0.60 to 0.87 and fix β = 0.5 when examining of 
the effect of γ.49 We set h as a relatively low value, h = 0.11, such that the economy becomes 
feasible and production occurs in this analysis. We set η as a relatively high value, η = 4. This 
is because if η is small, the cutoff in the bubbly steady state, *f , is close to 0, and as a result, 
there appear only small differences between the bubbly and bubbleless steady states in capital, 
z, the unemployment rate, u, and the labor-market tightness, θ. However, in the Great Recession 
in 2009, the difference in the unemployment rate before and after the crisis is around 5% in the 
United States. To yield such a significant difference in the unemployment rate in the bubble 
bursting, a relatively high value of η is necessary. Regarding µ, we assume an aggressive 
issuance of the new bubbly asset by private agents and set µ = 0.7. Regarding the remaining 
parameter values, A and σ, we set A = 1.5 and σ = 4 such that the average unemployment rates 
                                                   
49If we set γ greater than 0.87, the economy is infeasible. 
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are around 10% in the bubbleless steady state and around 2% in the bubbly steady state and the 
average jobs-to-applicants ratios (which is the average labor-market tightness) are around 1.44 
in the bubbleless steady state and 2.05 in the bubbly steady state when varying the workers’ 
Nash bargaining power, β.  
 Under these parameter values, the economy exhibits the case in which the presence of asset 
bubbles promotes capital accumulation, which we focus on in the current analysis. 
5.4.2.2  Labor market conditions and macroeconomic variables 
As seen in Figure 4, when varying β from 0.40 to 0.60, the workers’ output share, Ω, increases 
and capital accumulation increases. This outcome is not surprising because as Ω also increases, 
the savings of young agents increases. The unemployment rate in the bubbly steady state, u∗, 
is always smaller than that in the bubbleless steady state, u∗∗, and the labor-market tightness in 
the bubbly steady state, θ∗, is always greater than that in the bubbleless steady state, θ∗∗ because 
we focus on the case in which the presence of asset bubbles promotes capital accumulation. In 
both steady states, as β increases from 0.40 to 0.60, the labor-market tightness decreases and 
the unemployment rate increases. This outcome is not obvious because the workers’ output 
share, Ω, has non-linear effects on these variables. As Ω increases, capital increases in both 
steady states through the workers’ output share; however, the increase in Ω produces a 
downward pressure on the firms’ output share, and thus, the firms post the smaller number of 
vacant positions given a fixed search cost. The effect of Ω on the unemployment rate (the labor-
market tightness) in both steady states can be proven to be U-shaped (inverted U-shaped). In 
both steady states, the minimum unemployment rate is achieved around β = 0.1, which is an 
unrealistically small bargaining power in the advanced countries. When β changes from 0.40 
to 0.60, the undesirable effect of Ω on the unemployment rate dominates the preferable effect 
and the unemployment rate increases. Moreover, as β increases, the difference in the 
unemployment rate between the bubbly and bubbleless steady states becomes wider although 
the difference in capital accumulation is relatively stable. Without asset bubbles, as β increased, 
the undesirable effect of Ω on the unemployment rate is accelerated. However, the presence of 
asset bubbles mitigates the acceleration of the undesirable effect. 
 As in the case of β, the increase in the unemployment benefit ratio, γ, increases the workers’ 
output share, Ω, and thus, capital accumulation increases as seen in Figure 5. Although γ also 
has non-linear effects on the unemployment rate and the labor-market tightness in both steady 
states, one notes that the patterns of γ’s effects on the macroeconomic variables are very similar 
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to those of β. In particular, as γ increases from 0.60 to 0.87, the undesirable effect of Ω on the 
unemployment rate dominates the preferable effect. Without asset bubbles, the government 
policy that increases the unemployment benefit ratio, γ, would significantly increase the 
unemployment rate under the plausible value of γ. However, the presence of asset bubbles 
lessens this undesirable outcome: when asset bubbles occur, the increase in the unemployment 
rate is very small when γ varies from 0.60 to 0.87 relative to the case without asset bubbles. 
 
[Figure 4 around here] 
 
[Figure 5 around here] 
5.5  Self-fufilling financial crisis 
We consider a sunspot variable, te , that follows a two-state Markov process, whose support 
is {0, 1} and transition probabilities are given by Pr( te = 1| 1-te =1) = π
a and Pr( te = 0| 1-te =0) 
= πb where πa and πb∈(0, 1]. Denote the history of sunspot events until time t by te = { 0e , 
1e , ..., te }. The sunspot events are common across agents in each generation, being independent 
of idiosyncratic productivity shocks. The market price of the bubbly asset is subject to the 
sunspot variable, so we denote pt = pt ( te ). When determining the cutoff, 1-tf , agents have 
rational expectations regarding future sunspot events given the sunspot event, 1-te at time t − 
1, and thus, we denote 1-tf  = 1-tf ( 1-te ). Note that 1-tf ( 1-te ) becomes a deterministic variable 
when 1-te is realized although it is a stochastic variable before the realization of 1-te . 
5.5.1  Cutoffs in the stationary states 
The cutoff, 1-tf ( 1-te ), is no longer equal to rt/qt because the individual-specific return is a 
random variable. The market price of the bubbly asset is affected by the sunspot variable, so 
the individual-specific return, Rt+1, is a function of 1+te , given 
te . Then, Rt+1 is denoted by 
Rt+1( 1+te ) and obtained as follows: 
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Note that qt+1 = 11
-
+
aa tz  depends upon the sunspot history, 
te , because capital at time t + 1 is 
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determined at time t. Given the sunspot event, te , an agent at time t chooses a portfolio to 
maximize her expected lifetime utility: 
 ]|)([]|[ 11 tttttttt REsUE eee
ii
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]|)([ 11 tttt RE ee ++  is given by  
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, 
where at 1+r ={π
apt+1(1) + (1 − πa)pt+1(0)}/pt(1) and bt 1+r = {π
bpt+1(0) + (1 − πb)pt+1(1)}/pt(0). 
From these two equations, we obtain the cutoffs depending upon the sunspot realizations such 
as atf := tf ( te =1) =
a
t 1+r /qt+1( te = 1,
1-te ) and btf := tf ( te = 0) = bt 1+r /qt+1( te = 0,
1-te ). 
Because the return of holding the one unit of the bubbly asset is given by pt( te )/pt−1( 1-te ), Eq. 
(19) is rewritten as 
 )(
)()1(
)()( 11
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= tt
tt
tt
tt Bp
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ee , (41) 
where Bt ( te ) = pt( te )Mt. Given the sunspot event, 1-te , taking the expectation of both sides of 
Eq. (41) yields 
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Depending upon the realization of 1-te , this equation can be rewritten as  
 )1(
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and 
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t
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µ
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Inserting Eq. (21) respectively into Eqs. (42) and (43) yields 
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and 
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In what follows, our analysis focuses on a stationary rational expectations equilibrium with 
sunspots, such that af  := atf  = 
a
t 1-f and
 bf  := btf  = 
b
t 1-f .
50 By using Eqs. (24), (44) and 
(45) with af  = atr /qt (
1-te ) and bf  = btr /qt (
1-te ), we obtain the following two equations:
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and 
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We assume that af  > bf . Because the bubbly asset is freely disposable, Bt ≥ 0 and thus tf  
≥ 0 for all t ≥ 0 from Eq. (21). 
 
Lemma 2 Suppose that πa ∈ (0, 1) and 0 ≤ af  < bf . Then, if there exists a rational 
expectations equilibrium with the two-state sunspot variable that satisfies Eqs. (46) and (47), 
it must follow that bf  = 0 and πb = 1. 
Proof. See the Appendix. 
                                                   
50To be accurate, zt and ut in Eqs. (44) and (45) depend on the sunspot history, 1-te . Therefore, 
we should have explicitly written as zt ( 1-te = 1,
2-te ) and ut ( 1-te = 1,
2-te ) in Eq. (44) and zt 
( 1-te = 0,
2-te ) and ut ( 1-te = 0,
2-te ) in Eq. (45); however, we use simple notations to save a 
space. 
104 
 
 
Proposition 5 There exists a rational expectations equilibrium with the two state sunspot 
variable that satisfies Eqs. (46) and (47) such that bf  = 0 with πb = 1 and af  ∈ (0, *f ) 
with πa ∈ (0, 1). 
Proof. See the Appendix. 
 The state given by af  is bubbly whereas the state given by bf  is bubbleless. 
Proposition 5 implies that once asset bubbles burst caused by self-fulfilling expectations, the 
bubbly asset never has a market value after the bursting. This outcome is obtained because the 
bubbly asset is freely disposable and because as demonstrated in the previous section, the 
steady state, *f , in the dynamical system (27) is unstable and the steady state **f = 0 is stable. 
As noted from Eq. (26), capital accumulation in each state is given by 
 )(
)(1
)()1()( 11 -- Y-
W-
=Y tta
a
tt zzG
AHzz a
fµ
fa . (48) 
and 
 )()0()1()( 11 -- YW-=Y tttt zzAHzz
aa , (49) 
respectively. Figure 6 illustrates the case in which the presence of asset bubbles promotes 
capital accumulation, i.e., H( af )/[1 − µG( af )] > H(0). In this case, Eq. (48) is located in the 
upper place relative to Eq. (49). 
[Figure 6 around here] 
 Now we assume that 0e = 1, meaning that asset bubbles are present at time 0. In this case, 
capital accumulates over time if z0 < za where za = Q( af )1/(1−α) as seen in Figure 4. However, 
once asset bubbles burst at a certain time, say, t = tˆ , capital begins to decrease if tzˆ  > z
b 
where zb = Q( bf )1/(1−α), and accordingly the unemployment rate begins to increase following 
Eq. (26). 
 
5.6  Conclusion 
An overlapping-generation model is presented in which the presence asset bubbles ´a la Tirole 
(1985) promotes capital accumulation under mild parameter conditions. In a financially 
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constrained economy, although the presence of asset bubbles correct allocative inefficiency by 
excluding less productive agents from production activities, only the second best outcome can 
be attained as clarified by Bewley (1980). This consequence can be easily verified in our model 
by observing that not only agents who draw the highest productivity shock but also agents who 
draw relatively low productivity shocks engage in capital production when asset bubbles are 
present. Therefore, the unemployment rate when asset bubbles occur is not lowest relative to 
that in the first best outcome, which means that government policy is necessary for the economy 
to be Pareto-improved even though the presence of asset bubbles reduces the unemployment 
rate. The analysis of such government policy is beyond the scope of the current paper and left 
for future research. 
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Appendix 
Proof of Proposition 1 
If zt  ≤ z , no firms with vacancy can cover a search cost, h, at time t even though the matching 
probability is equal to one. Therefore, no firms can operate at time t. If zt > z , given the 
matching probability f (θt) ∈ (0, 1), firms with vacancy will cover a search cost, h, and firms 
that successfully match with a worker operate their business at time t. □ 
Proof of Proposition 2 
From Eq. (25), **f = 0 is obviously a steady state of the dynamical system because G( **f ) = 
0. It is noted from Eq. (25) that *f  is a candidate of another steady state. Therefore, all we 
must show is that *f  is uniquely determined. Define Λ(f ) := H(f )/(1 − µG(f )) and Γ(f ) := 
f α/[(1 − α)(1 − µ)Ω]. Note that Λ(f ) is the left-hand of Eq. (28) and Γ(f ) is the right-hand. 
Γ(f ) is linear with respect to f  with a positive slope and passes through the origin. To 
investigate the configuration of Λ(f ), define a function such that J(f ) := µH(f ) − f  (1 − 
µG(f )). Because )(fJ ¢ (f ) = µG(f ) − 1 < 0, J(f ) is monotonically decreasing. Additionally, 
J(0) = µH(0) > 0 and J(η) = −h(1 − µ) < 0. Therefore, J(f ) = 0 has a unique solution f  = f  
∈ (0, η) such that for f  ∈ [0, f ), it follows that J(f ) > 0 and for f  ∈ (f , η], it follows 
that J(f ) < 0. Because )(fL¢ (f ) = )(fG¢ J(f )/[1 −µG(f )]2, )(fL¢  is increasing in f  ∈ 
[0, f ) and decreasing in f  ∈ (f , η]. Moreover, Λ(0) = H(0) > 0 and Λ(η) = 0. As such, 
the configurations of Γ(f ) and Λ(f ) confirm the uniqueness of *f  in Eq. (27). □ 
 
Proof of Lemma1 
Because (1 − α)ΩAH(fˆ ) zˆ α−1/(1 − µG(fˆ )) = 1, the linearization of Eq. (26) around the steady 
state, ( zˆ ,fˆ ), yields 
 )ˆ(
)ˆ(ˆ)ˆ(
)()ˆ(ˆ)ˆ(
)ˆ(ˆ)ˆ(
)ˆ(ˆ)ˆ(ˆ 11 ff
fa a
-
Y¢+Y
¢Y
+-
Y¢+Y
Y¢+Y
=- -- ttt zzz
Qzzzz
zzz
zzzzz , (A.1) 
where Q(x) = (1 − α)ΩH(x)/(1 − µG(x)). Eq. (A.1) yields κ1( zˆ ) as follows: 
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where zˆ  = z∗ or z∗∗. The linearization of Eq. (25) around the steady state yields 
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When fˆ  = *f , Eq. (A.2) can be rewritten as 
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because α(1 − µG( *f ))/[(1 − µ)(1 − α)ΩH( *f )] = 1/ *f . Therefore, we have 
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When fˆ  = **f  = 0, Eq. (A.2) can be rewritten as 
 )(0 **1
** ffff -=- -tt . (A.4) 
Therefore, we have 
 0)( **2 =fk . □  
Proof of Proposition 3 
Obviously, it follows that |κ1(z∗∗)| < 1 and |κ2( **f )| < 1. Therefore, the bubbleless steady state, 
(z∗∗, **f ), is totally stable. Because |κ1(z∗)| < 1, all we must show is |κ2( *f )| > 1. To show this, 
define 
 )()(:)( fff L-G=Q , 
where Γ(f ) and Λ(f ) are defined in the proof of Proposition 2. As shown in the proof of 
Proposition 2, Θ(f ) = 0 has a unique solution, which is f  = *f . Therefore, the fact that Θ(0) 
< 0 and Θ(η) > 0 implies that )( *fQ¢ ( *f ) > 0, or equivalently, 
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The use of Eq. (29) rewrites Eq. (B.1) as 
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Furthermore, Eq. (B.2) can be computed as 
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The left-hand side of Eq. (B.3) is κ2( *f ), and thus, the bubbly steady state is a saddle point. □ 
Proof of Proposition 4 
From Figure 4, if α/[(1 − α)(1 − µ)Ω]> (<) H(0)/ f~ , it follows that Λ( *f )> (<) Λ(0) = H(0), 
and thus, Q( *f )> (<) Q(0). From the last and Proposition 2, we obtain the desired conclusion. 
□ 
Proof of lemma 2 
The proof is done by contradiction. Suppose that πb ∈ (0, 1). From Eq. (47), we have 
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Because πb ∈ (0, 1) and bf  < af , it follows from Eq. (C.1) that 
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Likewise, from Eq. (46), it follows that 
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From the configurations of Λ(f ) and Γ(f ) (which are defined in the proof of Proposition 2), 
for f  ∈ ( *f , η], it holds that Λ(f ) < Γ(f ), and for f  ∈ [0, *f ), it holds that Λ(f ) > 
Γ(f ). Therefore, we obtain *f  < bf . Because bf  < af , we have Λ( af ) < Γ( af ), or 
equivalently, 
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Eq. (C.4) contradicts Eq. (C.3). Therefore, it must follow that πb = 1. When πb = 1, Eq. (47) 
yields bf  =	 *f  or bf  = 0. If bf  = *f , we have *f  < af . However, *f  < af  again 
leads a contradiction. Hence, bf  = 0. □ 
Proof of Proposition 5 
From Lemma 2, it must hold that πb = 1 and bf  = 0. In this case, Eq. (46) can be rewritten as 
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From Eq. (D.1), we obtain Λ( af ) > Γ( af ) for πa ∈ (0, 1), and thus, af  ∈ (0, *f ) with πa 
∈ (0, 1). □ 
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Table 1:  Parameterization 
α = 0.36  β = 0.50 (Fig. 5)  γ = 0.80 (Fig. 4)  η = 4  
σ = 4 µ = 0.7 A = 1.5 h = 0.11 
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